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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume XXIV DECEMBER, 1938 Number 1
THE CHARITABLE CORPORATION AND
THE CHARITABLE TRUST
THOMAS E. BLACKWELLt
I. INTRODUCTORY
The past thirty years or more have witnessed a vast increase
in the property and funds held by educational, philanthropic,
and other charitable institutions in this country. Statistics in
this field are difficult to assemble, but incomplete estimates indi-
cate the magnitude of the problem. According to a survey made
in this field in 1932 by Wood, Struthers & Company of New
York, "the fact that philanthropy's trustees have a responsibility
of monumental size may be grasped by examining the following
exhibits * * *"I '
Philanthropies Property and Endowment
Religion ------------------------ $3,839,500,000.00
Higher Education--- .............. 2,815,000,000.00
Hospitals ------------------.------------- 1,400,000,000.00
Foundations ----------.-------- 1,000,000,000.00
Organized Charity --------------- 239,000,000.00
Total ------------------------------- $9,293,500,000.00
It is a matter of common knowledge that the majority of these
great institutions and foundations are corporations-charitable
corporations. In what capacity do these corporations hold their
funds-as technical trustees, subject to all the restrictions and
f Ph.B., University of Chicago, 1921; M.S. in B.A., Washington Univer-
sity, 1925; J.D., 1938; Comptroller of Washington University.
1. Trusteeship of American Endowments (1932) 6. According to the
Office of Education of the United States Department of the Interior, insti-
tutions of higher education, in 1934, held physical property and permanent
funds totalling $3,792,605,030.00. Of this amount, $1,472,946,354.00 repre-
Nented endowment funds. Statistics of Higher Education, 19.3-34, Bien-
nial Survey of Education in the United States (1932-34).
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limitations evolved by courts of equity in the field of trusts, or
in absolute ownership, subject only to the provisions of their
own charters? The very phrasing of this question may startle
some, so general is the assumption that institutions of this char-
acter hold their funds in trust.
A survey of the cases, however, indicates an interesting con-
flict of opinion. One need only contrast the view expressed by
the Restatement of the Law of Trusts2 with that of a recent
decision in Nebraska3 in order to frame the issue. According
to the Restatement, if the charitable institution receiving the
2. Restatement, T'usts (1935) sec. 348, Introductory Note: "Where
property is given to a charitable corporation, a charitable trust is not
created, even though by the terms of the gift the corporation is directed
to hold the principal forever and to devote the income only to the accom-
plishment of the purposes of the corporation, and even though by the terms
of the gift the corporation is directed to use the property only for a par-
ticular one of its purposes."
3. Hobbs v. Board of Education of Northern Baptist Convention (Neb.
1934) 253 N. W. 627:
"The endowment fund was initiated June 23, 1892, by a gift from 'The
American Baptist Education Society' under a written proposal in the fol-
lowing terms: 'Will contribute to Grand Island College located at Grand
Island in the State of Nebraska for the purpose of endowment for said
institution, and to be invested and preserved inviolable as such, the sum
of five thousand dollars. * * *'
"Under these circumstances and the conditions the question recurs: Does
this endowment fund constitute a charitable trust? If so, it is not subject
to the claims of creditors, and, if not, it belongs to the general assets of
the college. * * *
"We think that all these cases are distinguishable from the one under
consideration by the fact that the absolute control of the corpus of the
estate conveyed was transferred to the grantee, while here the body of the
gifts and contributions were distinctly stated to be for the endowment of
the college, the corpus to be kept intact and inviolable, and the income only
to be used for the general purposes of the college. While the legal title or
estate may be said to be in the college, it is not an absolute estate. The
college is given no control over anything but the income arising therefrom.
The college has no beneficial interest in the body of the gift, and the real
beneficiaries of the trust are the students who attend the college for the
purpose of education. * * * This is in its very nature a charitable trust,
and to put any other construction upon t]ie instruments evidencing the
donations would destroy and render nugatory the benevolent intentions of
the donors."
See also Woman's Foreign Missionary Society v. Mitchell (1901) 93 Md.
199, 48 At. 737, 53 L. R. A. 711; Clarke v. Sisters of Society of the Holy
Child Jesus (1908) 82 Neb. 85, 117 N. W. 107; Bennett v. Baltimore Hu-
mane Impartial Society (1900) 91 Md. 10, 45 Atl. 888; Bird v. Merklee
(1895) 144 N. Y. 544, 39 N. E. 645, 27 L. R. A. 423; Wetmore v. Parker
(1873) 52 N. Y. 450; Whitmore v. Church of the Holy Cross (1922) 121
Me. 391, 117 Atl. 469; Doan v. Vestry of Ascension Parish (1906) 103 Md.
662, 64 At. 341, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1119; Art Students' League v. Hinkley
(D. C. D. Md. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 469, aff'd (C. C. A. 4, 1930) 37 F. (2d)
225, cert. denied (1930) 281 U. S. 733.
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gift is incorporated, a charitable trust is not created, though by
the terms of the gift the corporation is directed to hold the prin-
cipal intact as a perpetual fund and may use only the income
for one or more designated purposes. On the other hand, the
Nebraska court contends that under such conditions, i. e., where
the corpus must be retained intact and inviolable, with only the
income expendable, the institution holds the property merely as
trustee, not as owner; consequently, such assets are not subject
to claims of creditors of the insolvent institution. In other words,
unrestricted gifts and those permitting the principal to be ex-
pended become the absolute property of the corporation, but all
endowment funds are held as charitable trusts.
Again, the federal district court for Maryland has held that
not even the use of the words "in trust" was sufficient to limit
the title of the charitable corporation to that of trustee.4 The
Art Students' League of New York had been given certain prop-
erty for an endowment fund, to be known as the Edward G.
McDowell Travelling Scholarship, the income to be expended for
the education of deserving art students abroad. According to the
test laid down for the guidance of Nebraska courts, this was
clearly a charitable trust. The court, reviewing the decisions of
the jurisdiction, concluded that it is impossible to create a chari-
table trust in Maryland by a gift to a corporation for a cor-
porate purpose.5
Both viewpoints find solid support in the cases, but it is sub-
mitted that this conflict can be explained and reconciled by a
consideration of the following factors: (1) the desire of the
court to preserve the charity as against adverse claimants, if
possible; (2) the history of statutory and decisional law in the
field of private and charitable trusts in certain jurisdictions.
Despite the spectacular failure of the "Tilden Trust,"6 it may
be said that courts have paid more than lip service to the maxim,
"Charity is the favorite of equity."
As courts and text writers have pointed out, charitable trusts
are construed as valid wherever possible by applying the most
4. Art Students' League v. Hinkley (D. C. D. Md. 1929) 31 F. (2d)
469, aff'd (C. C. A. 4, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 225, cert. denied (1930) 281 U. S.
733
F. 31 F. (2d) at 479.
6. See for extended discussion Ames, The Failure of the Tilden Trust(1891) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 289.
1938]
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liberal rules of which the nature of the case admits.7 This liber-
ality has apparently led the courts into certain inconsistencies.
Thus in each of the two cases referred to, the charitable gift was
sustained or protected against adverse claimants, in the Mary-
land case by holding the fund an absolute gift to the charitable
corporation and not an attempt to create a trust for "indefinite
and uncertain beneficiaries," banned by Maryland's statutes and
legal precedents, and in the Nebraska case by ruling that it was
not an absolute gift to the Grand Island College, subject to the
demands of its creditors, but a charitable trust, not to be dissi-
pated and diverted from its original charitable purpose.
This rule of Liberality toward charitable gifts and bequests
is not difficult to justify.
Springing as they usually do, from the very best that is
in human nature, and having for their object the ameliora-
tion of the hard condition of those who are at odds with fate
and fortune, it is the policy of an enlightened jurisdiction
to uphold and sustain them wherever this can be done with-
out violation of positive principles of law.8
II. INCEPTION AND MEANING OF THE CHARITABLE TRUST
The development of the law of charitable uses is an exceed-
ingly interesting field and has given rise to great conflict of
opinion. The early history of the subject is beyond the scope of
this article, and it will be necessary to restrict consideration of
the topic to the issues that serve to explain and reconcile the con-
flict of decisions in this country.
The most important landmark in this entire field is, of course,
the Statute of Charitable Uses.9 Although the remedial sections
of the statute were repealed by Parliament in 1888,10 the pre-
amble was considered of sufficient importance by way of exhibit-
ing the spirit of charities to warrant retention. Frequently cited
by the courts of this country, it reads:
Whereas lands, tenements, rents, annuities, profits, here-
ditaments, goods, chattels, money and stocks of money,
7. Rusell v. Allen (1883) 107 U. S. 163; Ould v. Washington Hospital(1877) 95 U. S. 303; Hadley v. Forsee (1907) 203 Mo. 418, 101 S. W. 59,
14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49.
8. Green's Adm'rs v. Fidelity Trust Co. of Louisville (1909) 134 Ky.
311, 120 S. W. 283, 288, 20 Ann. Cas. 861; 2 Perry, Trusts (7th ed. 1929)
sec. 691.
9. 43 Eliz. c. 4 (1601).
10. 51 & 52 Vict. c. 42, sec. 13 (1888).
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have been heretofore given, limited, appointed and assigned,
as well by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, and her most
noble progenitors, as by sundry other well-disposed persons;
some for relief of aged, impotent and poor people, some for
maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners,
schools of learning, free schools, and scholars in universi-
ties, some for repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways,
churches, sea-banks and highways, some for education and
preferment of orphans, some for or towards relief, stock or
maintenance for houses of correction, some for marriages of
poor maids, some for supportation, aid and help of young
tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed, and others
for relief or redemption of prisoners or captives, and for aid
or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payments of
fifteens, setting out of soldiers and other taxes; which lands
* * * have not been employed according to the charitable
intent of the givers and founders thereof, by reason of
frauds, breaches of trust, and negligence in those that should
pay, deliver and employ the same for redress and remedy
whereof :-
The remedial portions of the statute authorized the Chancellor
to commission certain officials to inquire into breaches of chari-
table trusts.
Although this recital of the types of charity given recognition
by Elizabethan courts is of general interest to the student of the
history of equitable jurisprudence, it is clear that modern courts
should not accept it as an exclusive list of charitable trusts to be
given recognition and protection under modern concepts of social
needs.
One of the most frequently cited definitions of a legal charity
is that of Justice Gray:
A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined
as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for
the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by
bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of edu-
cation or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease,
suffering, or constraint, by assisting them to establish them-
selves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings
or works or by otherwise lessening the burdens of govern-
ment. 1
11. Jackson v. Phillips (1867) 14 Allen (96 Mass.) 539, 556, quoted in
whole or in part in (1896) Stuart v. Easton (1896) 164 U. S. 706; (1898)
170 U. S. 383; In re Hinkly (1881) 58 Cal. 457; Buckly v. Monck (Mo.
1916) 187 S. W. 31; Crow v. Clay County (1906) 196 Mo. 234, 95 S. W.
369; Haggerty v. St. Louis, Keokuk & Northwestern R. Co. (1903) 100 Mo.
1938l
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"Charity" in its popular sense means whatever is bestowed
gratuitously on the needy or suffering for their relief.12 In a
leading case on this point, the court, referring to the word "char-
ity" in a will, said:
That word in its widest sense denotes all the good affec-
tions men ought to bear toward each other; in its most re-
stricted and common sense, relief of the poor. In neither of
these senses is it employed in this court. Here its signifi-
cance is derived chiefly from the Statute of Elizabeth."
In other words, charity in the legal sense is not confined to
mere almsgiving, but has a much wider scope and significance,
embracing the improvement of social conditions and the promo-
tion of the happiness of mankind. However, courts have been
prompt to point out that, while charity may be benevolence, all
benevolence is not necessarily charity in the eyes of the law.
All charities which are recognized as such within the meaning
of the law of charitable uses are in some degree public in char-
acter. The line of demarcation between public and private char-
ity has been "pricked out" at different levels by the courts,
and this has caused much of the apparent want of harmony in
the decisions. It should be borne in mind that only where the
court can find some element of public benefit and advantage will
it feel free to apply the peculiar provisions of the law of chari-
table trusts.
The word "peculiar" is employed advisedly, since it is some-
thing of an anomaly in our system of jurisprudence that a private
individual, by employing suitable phraseology, is permitted to
exercise control over the use and disposition of property in per-
petuity. Only where the benefits conferred are such as are of
interest to the public at large or to a substantial portion thereof
can we find justification for this delegation of power to an indi-
vidual member of society.
As Professor Bogert has indicated,14 the statement that the
rule against perpetuities does not apply to charitable trusts is
both vague and misleading. It may refer to any one or all of
the four restrictive rules worked out by the courts in the field
App. 424, 74 S. W. 456; State v. Powers (1881) 10 Mo. App. 263; Crerar v.
Williams (1893) 145 Ill. 625, 34 N. E. 467, 21 L. R. A. 454.
12. Utica Trust & Deposit Co. v. Thomson (Sup. Ct. 1914) 87 Misc. 31,
149 N. Y. S. 392.
13. Morice v. Durham (Ch. 1804) 9 Ves. J. 399, 405, 32 Eng. Rep. 947.
14. 2 Bogert, Trusts (1935) sec. 341.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss1/1
THE CHARITABLE CORPORATION
of private trusts, i. e., the rule against remoteness of vesting of
contingent interests, the comnmon law rule against restraints on
alienation, the statutory rules against undue suspension of the
power of alienation, or the rule against unduly postponing the
direct enjoyment of property. Moreover, some of these rules
do apply to a degree to charitable trusts. However, it is true that
this power to erect a plan of benevolence extending into the
indefinite future exists and courts have been compelled to evolve
in the cy pres doctrine, compensatory powers of modification and
control equally unusual and anomalous.
The phrase originally used was cy pres comme possible and
freely translated meant "as near as possible."'1 Generally speak-
ing, it refers to that power vested in a court of equity which
permits it to make specific a general charitable intent of a settlor
and, where lapse of time and changed conditions render an
original specific intent impossible or inexpedient, to substitute
another plan of administration which approaches "as nearly as
possible" the original scheme of the donor. In other words, it
designates that power which courts of equity have evolved to
correct the lack of wisdom and foresight of the benevolently in-
clined, permitting them to mould the charitable trust to meet
the vicissitudes of a changing world.
The nice distinctions between the judicial and prerogative cy
pres powers have been considered in detail by the text writers.'16
The doctrine is of immediate interest here only to the extent that
it serves to throw light on the question of the extent to which
the power of equity over charitable uses depends upon the Statute
of Elizabeth. The answer to this problem has a direct bearing
upon the conflict of authority in this country.
III. EFFECT OF LEGISLATIVE REJECTION OF ENGLISH
STATUTES
A. The Charitable Trzust in Virginia and Maryland
In the leading case of The Trustees of the Philadelphia Bap-
tist Association v. Hart's Exec 1tors," 7 the United States Supreme
Court was called upon to pass on the validity of a bequest to an
15. Ironmongers' Company v. Attorney General (H. L. 1844) 10 Cl. &
Fin. 908, 8 Eng. Rep. 983.
16. 2 Bogert, Trusts (1935) see. 432; Note (1907) 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 59.
17. (1819) 4 Wheat. 1.
1938]
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unincorporated society, whereby Hart, a citizen of Virginia, at-
tempted to create an endowed scholarship "for the education of
youths of the Baptist denomination, who shall appear promising
for the ministry." Since at the time of the death of testator the
society was unincorporated, the court took the position that the
gift could be sustained only as a charitable trust with the indi-
vidual members as trustees. Had the society been a charitable
corporation, the court indicated that the bequest could be con-
strued as an absolute gift to the corporation, for its corporate
purposes and those ancillary thereto. Unfortunately for the so-
ciety and for the subsequent history of charities in this country,
the Virginia legislature had, three years prior to the death of
Hart, repealed all English statutes. Although obviously not
aimed at the destruction of the jurisdiction of equity over chari-
table trusts, the Statute of Elizabeth fell with the others.
Counsel for the society strongly urged that "the peculiar law
of charities" did not originate with the famous statute,-that it
did not even "profess to give any validity to devises or legacies
not before good, but only furnishes a new and more convenient
mode of discovering and enforcing them. Chief Justice Marshall,
speaking for the court, held that prior to enactment of the stat-
ute in England in 1601, charitable uses such as the one in ques-
tion were not recognized, and that they owe their validity in
England either to the statute or to prerogative cy pres powers,
neither of which were part of the law of Virginia. 8
It then became accepted Virginia law that
In short, there cannot be a trust without a cestui que
trust, and if it cannot be ascertained who the cestui que trust
is, it is the same as if there were none.',
18. Gallego's Ex'rs v. Att'y Gen. (1832) 30 Va. 450; Stonestreet v. Doyle(1881) 75 Va. 356. "These principles, it is confidently believed, are the
general principles of the common law upon this subject. If there are ex-
ceptions to these principles, those exceptions may without doubt be shown.
A diligent search has led me to the conviction, that there was no case at
common law, in which a bequest or a trust of this indefinite character
would be supported; and the learned counsel on both sides have acknowl-
edged that they have been unable to discover any case anterior to the
Statute 43 Elizabeth in which the validity of such bequests has been dis-
tinctly recognized. It ought, therefore, perhaps suffice to rest the argu-
ment here, since, if under the general principle the bequest would be void,
it is incumbent upon those who claim to be protected by an exception to
establish that exception." Gallego's Ex'rs v. Att'y Gen., supra, at 467. See
also Kain v. Gibboney (1879) 101 U. S. 362.
19. (1832) 30 Va. 450, 466.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss1/1
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Vidal v. Girard's Executors,20 the next most important deci-
sion in this field, clearly showed that the view of the Hart case
regarding the scope of English equitable jurisprudence prior to
the Statute of Elizabeth was based upon incomplete research.
The decision repudiated the doctrine of Baptist Association v.
Hart's Executors.21 The Virginia courts, for a long pericd, pos-
sibly out of deference to the great Chief Justice Marshall, de-
clined to follow the path indicated by the Girard Case and con-
tinued to hold charitable trusts on the same footing as other
trusts to be sustained or rejected according to the same criteria.
However, some fifty years later the courts of the state at-
tempted to break away and in 1885,22 relying on a certain saving
clause in the general act of repeal of 1792, held that the Statute
of Elizabeth had not been repealed, and that even though the
statute were not in force, equity could enforce charitable trusts
by reason of its inherent powers. The court pointed out that the
Virginia charity doctrine did not have its "judicial birth" in
20. (1844) 2 How. 127. The great size of the estate, the eminence of
counsel, the peculiar provisions of the trust instrument, and the importance
of the ouestions involved excited great interest at the time.
21. (1819) 4 Wheat. 1. Justice Story, after observing that the Statute
of 43rd of Elizabeth had been adjudged by the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania not to be in force in that state, in commenting on the Hart case,
said: "But very strong additional light has been thrown upon this subject
bv the recent publications of the Commissioners on the Public Records in
England, which contain a very curious and interesting collection of the
Chancery records in the reign of Queen Elizabeth and in the earlier reigns.
Among these are found nlanv cases in which the Court of Chanc-rv enter-
tained iuriqliction over charities long before the Statute of 43 Elizabeth;
and some fifty of these cases, extracted from the printed calendars, have
been laid before us. They establish in the most satisfactory and conclusive
manner that cases of charities where there were trustees appointed for
general and indefinite charities, as well as for specific charities, were
familiarly known to, and acted upon, and enforced in the Court of Chan-
cery. In some of these cases the charities were not only of an uncertain
and in(;efirite naturp. but, as far as we can gather from the imperfect
statement in the printed records, they were also cases where there were
no trustees appointed, or the trustees were not competent to take. These
records, therefore, do in a remarkable manner, confirm the opinions of Sir
Joseph Jekyll, Lord Northington, Lord Chief Justice Wilmot, Lord Redes-
dale, and Lord Chancellor Sugden. Whatever doubts, therefore, might prop-
erlv be entertained from the subject when the case of The Trustees of the
Philadelphia Paptist -Association v. Hart's Executors, 4 Wheaton 1, was
before this court (1819), those doubts are entirely removed by the late and
more satisfactory sources of information to which we have alluded. If,
then, this be the true state of the common law on the subject of charities,
it would, upon the general princinle already suggested, be a part of the
common law of Pennsylvania." 2 How. at 196.
22. Protestant Episcopal Education Society v. Churchman (1885) 80 Va.
718, 772.
1938]
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Virginia but was an error copied from the Supreme Court of the
United States. This same position was taken four years later,23
and it appeared as though the state might free itself from its
narrow view of the inherent power of equity over charities. Some
eight years later, however, the court felt compelled to return to
its old doctrine on the grounds that the law had been built up
by a long line of decisions and, though based upon possibly er-
roneous conceptions, was too well settled to be overturned by
judicial legislation.24 Subsequent Virginia cases have been con-
tent to follow this reasoning.25
The legislature of Virginia has been willing to make minor
modifications, 26 but the general limitations upon charitable trusts
remain. It should be noted that, with the exception of these
statutory provisions for certain charitable trusts, the only satis-
factory procedure available to the charitably inclined in Virginia
is to make the gift or bequest directly to a charitable corporation
for one or more of its corporate purposes. 2 Since West Virginia
did not sever its ties with Virginia until Civil War days, it is
not surprising that its decisions on this, as well as many other
points of law, are practically parallel. In 1873 the supreme court
of the new state approved the Virginia doctrine. 2  After the
Virginia court made its first attempt to break away in 1885, we
find the following conservative comment:
* * * we are not moved to depart from, the line of safe
precedents established by the Court of Appeals, from the
time of the decision in Gallego's Executors v. Attorney Gen-
eral and followed by this court to the present time * * * 21
In the absence of a definite cestui to initiate equitable pro-
ceedings against the trustee in the event of serious deviations
from the original intent of the donor, adequate control may be
lacking; and the West Virginia court evidently preferred to ad-
23. Trustees v. Guthrie (1889) 36 Va. 125, 10 S. E. 318, 6 L. R. A. 321.
24. Fifield v. Van Wyck (1897) 94 Va. 557, 570, 27 S. E. 446.
25. Jordan v. Richmond Home for Ladies (1907) 106 Va. 710, 56 S. E.
730; Jordan v. Universalist General Convention Trustees (1907) 107 Va. 79,
57 S. E. 652.
26. See Va. Code (1936) sees. 587:-590.
27. Jordan v. Universalist General Convention Trustees (1907) 107 Va.
79, 57 S. E. 652. For cases holding such a bequest to a charitable corpora-
tion valid see Roy's Ex'rs v. Rowzie (1874) 66 Va. 599; Fitzgerald v. Dog-
gett's Ex'rs (1930) 155 Va. 112, 155 S. E. 129.
28. Bible Society v. Pendleton (1873) 7 W. Va. 79; see also Knox v.
Knox (1876) 9 W. Va. 124.
29. Wilson v. Perry (1886) 29 W. Va. 169, 1 S. E. 302, 321.
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here to the plan of restricting charitable administration to cor-
porations with definite and limited charter powers. It was care-
ful to explain that its doctrine was not intended to banish charity
from the state, nor "to dry up the streams of charitable feelings
and actions," but to control to a limited extent the manner of
their operation.
The law on this subject has had a very similar history in
Maryland. Although the legislature did not specifically repeal
all English statutes after the Revolution, the Maryland Consti-
tution of 1776 provided that only those passed before the time
of the first immigration to the state and which were found ap-
plicable to local needs were to be considered in force. In 1822
its courts were compelled to determine whether the Statute of
Charitable Uses had been thus engrafted into the common law
of the state. The state had theretofore commissioned one Kilty
to draft a report as to the English statutes to be rejected. His
opinion that the English system of charitable uses was ill adapted
to local needs was followed by the court with the comment that
"it was a safe guide in exploring an otherwise dubious path."30
But, as in Virginia, gifts to charitable corporations for one
or more corporate purposes were early recognized in Maryland.
Since in order to sustain the charity it was necessary that the
court find an intent to make an absolute gift and not an attempt
to create a trust for indefinite and uncertain beneficiaries, even
the use of the most precise terminology did not deter the courts.
In the federal case discussed at the beginning of the article3'
the words "in trust" were not sufficient to turn the scales. But
further on the court made a most illuminating comment:
It is also of significance that gifts and devises to corpora-
tions for charitable purposes, which we hold to be valid in
Maryland, because we deny that they are trusts, would be
called charitable trusts in those jurisdictions in which such
settlements are valid in accord with the rule in the Girard
Will case.32
In attempting to rationalize its doctrine with reference to the
absolute title of charitable corporations, the Maryland court has
30. Dashiell v. Attorney General (1822) 5 Har. and J. (Md.) 392, 9
Am. Dec. 572.
31. Art Students' League v. Hinkley (D. C. D. Mo. 1929) 31 F. (2d)
469, aff'd (C. C. A. 4, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 225, cert. denied (1930) 281 U. S.
733.
32. 31 F. (2d) at 478.
1938]
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said that to hold otherwise would be equivalent to saying the
corporation took the property in trust for itself.33 It is sub-
mitted that this reasoning begs the question. Let us take the case
of a true charitable trust. In the hands of individual trustees,
the trust funds are held for the benefit of an indefinite group of
beneficiaries, and to a larger degree, for the benefit of the public
at large. If these trust funds, subject to the same provisions,
are given to a Maryland charitable corporation with charter
powers broad enough to include the provisions of the gift, the
court would say that this cannot constitute a trust because the
corporation would then be holding the property in trust for it-
self. But are not the real beneficiaries the same, whether the
funds be held by individual trustees or by a charitable corpora-
tion? Can it be said with any degree of realism that the chari-
table corporation would be the beneficiary if the court preferred
to call the fund a charitable trust?
The evidence seems quite clear that the Virginia and Maryland
courts evolved this doctrine because of a belief that statutory
and judicial control would be more effective over corporate chari-
ties than over charitable trusts. It should be recalled in this con-
nection that religious corporations were greatly disfavored in
Virginia in its early days, and this hostility was written into its
constitution.34
Another modern case35 in which the Maryland court disre-
garded language usually considered indicative of an intent to
create a trust was concerned with the following provisions of the
will:
I give and devise unto Trinity Reformed Church * ** my
hotel property * * * in trust to the support of the minister,
who may from time to time be in charge of said church.
The court said as to this:
* * * there was no intention upon the part of the testator
to create a trust, and * * * the corporation takes the legal
and beneficial title to the property, and * * *, therefore, its
estate is one in fee simple.36
33. Baltzell v. Church Home (1909) 110 Md. 244, 73 At]. 151.
34. Art. 5, sec. 17. See especially in this connection Gallego's Ex'rs v.
Att'y Gen. (1832) 3 Leigh (30 Va.) 450, 477.
35. Conner v. Trinity Reformed Church (1916) 129 Md. 360, 99 Atl. 547.
36. 99 At. at 549. Accord: Society v. Gaither (C. C. D. Md. 1894) 62
Fed. 422; Bennett v. Humane Society (1900) 91 Md. 10, 45 At. 1888;
Church Extension v. Smith (1881) 56 Md. 362; Doan v. Ascension Parish
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The status of the charitable trust in the District of Columbia
is the same as in Maryland for the obvious reason that, although
the District was originally carved from Virginia and Maryland,
the part ceded by Virginia was retroceded in 1846, leaving Mary-
land law as the rule of decision in the new territorial subdivi-
sion.37 This was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court
in 1877. 8
Thus Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and the District of
Columbia may be grouped together in this analysis since the doc-
trine announced by them may be traced to a general repeal of
the English statutes and a refusal on the part of their courts
to admit the somewhat anomalous doctrine of the charitable use
into the body of the common law.
B. The New York Doctrine
Another group of states adhering to a somewhat similar posi-
tion consists of New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.
In 1829 the New York legislature attempted a codification of
the law of uses and trusts, abolishing all except those specifically
authorized. At this early date in the history of the state, with
little accumulated wealth to give rise to litigation with reference
to gifts to charity, it is not surprising that those drafting this
code failed even to mention the charitable trust.3 9 When it was
contended that this early statutory revision impliedly excluded
the charitable trust, the court refused to entertain such a view
"so contrary to the public interests and to the spirit of the age. 4 0
However, six years later' the court evidently yielded to the per-
suasive eloquence of counsel for disappointed heirs and held the
(1906) 103 Md. 662, 64 At]. 314; Eutaw Place Baptist Church v. Shively(1887) 67 Md. 493, 10 Atl. 244; Gray v. Peter Gray Orphans' Home (1916)
128 Md. 592, 98 Atl. 202; Hanson v. Little Sisters of the Poor (1894) 79
Md. 434, 32 Atl. 1052, 32 L. R. A. 293; Pratt v. Sheppard and E. P. Hos-
pital (1898) 88 Md. 610, 627, 42 Atl. 51; Rizer v. Perry (1882) 58 Md. 112;
Shaeffer v. Klee (1905) 100 Md. 264, 59 Atl. 850; Snowden v. Crown Cork
& Seal (1911) 114 Md. 650, 80 Atl. 510, Ann. Cas. 1912A 679; Trinity
M. E. Church South v. Baker (1900) 91 Md. 539, 46 Atl. 1020; Van Reuth
v. City Council of Baltimore (1934) 170 Ati. 199; Waters v. Order of the
Holy Cross (1928) 155 Md. 146, 142 Atl. 297; Williams v. Baptist Church(1901) 92 Md. 497, 48 Atl. 930, 54 L. R. A. 427; Woman's Foreign Mis-
sionary Society v. Mitchell (1901) 93 Md. 199, 48 At. 737, 53 L. R. A. 711.
37. Zollman, American Law of Charities (1924) 20.
38. Ould v. Washington Hospital (1877) 95 U. S. 303.
39. N. Y. Rev. Stat. (1839) 727.
40. Shotwell v. Molt (1844) 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 46, 51.
41. Yates v. Yates (1850) 9 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 324.
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language of the statute too plain and unequivocal to be disre-
garded, criticizing the earlier holding as judicial legislation and
calling upon the legislature to correct the situation by a more
thorough revision of the statutes.
The court wavered in its position on the subject,42 but by 1873
the controversy was practically closed. By this time the only
way a testator could devote his property to charity was to give
it to a charitable corporation already chartered by the state or
to be formed within a limited period. The court in that year said:
* * * corporations can only take and hold property to the
amount and for the purposes prescribed by their charters or
acts of incorporation, and to this extent each act of incor-
poration is a dispensation in favor of the particular corpora-
tion, in respect to the prohibitions of the statute against
perpetuities. But for this dispensation, which is in effect a
repeal pro tanto of the statute against perpetuities, grants
of property to charitable corporations, for their general pur-
poses would be incompatible with the statute * * * for the
reason that every such grant implies that it is to be held in
perpetuity for the purposes of the grantee * * *.43
In 1891 the New York court faced an acid test of this doctrine.
Samuel J. Tilden attempted by his will to create a charitable
trust of some five million dollars "to establish and maintain a
free library and reading room in the City of New York, and to
promote such scientific and educational objects as my said exe-
cutors and trustees may designate." 44 The court felt constrained
to follow its rule previously established, but the size of the estate
lost to charity and the national prominence of the donor stimu-
lated a critical examination of the subject.45
In 1893 the New York legislature took cognizance of the prob-
lem to the extent of passing a statute-termed "The Tilden Act.""0
42. See Williams v. Williams (1853) 4 Seld. (8 N. Y.) 425; Owens v.
Missionary Society (1856) 4 Kern (14 N. Y.) 380; Downey v. Marshall
(1861) 23 N. Y. 366.
43. Holmes v. Mead (1873) 52 N. Y. 332, 339-40.
44. Tilden v. Green (1891) 130 N. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 880, 29 N. E. 1033,
14 L. R. A. 33, 27 Am. St. Rep. 487.
45. Ames, The Failure of the Tilden Trust (1891) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 289.
46. An act to regulate Gifts for Charitable Purposes, N. Y. Laws of
1893, c. 701: "Sec. 1. No gift, grant or devise to religious, educational,
charitable or benevolent uses which shall, in other respects be valid under
the laws of this state, shall or be deemed invalid by reason of the indefinite-
ness or uncertainty of the persons designated as the beneficiaries there-
under in the instrument creating such a gift, grant, bequest or devise, if
there is a trustee named to execute the same, the legal title to the lands
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The act did not reestablish the entire structure of the English
common law respecting the charitable use or trust. It restored
merely one feature of it, that which permitted a charitable use
for uncertain persons-personae incertaq, and to this extent re-
lieved charitable trusts from the limitations imposed upon private
uses in lands by earlier legislation.47 Had the legislature gone
a step further and relieved charitable or public uses from the
application of the rules relating to perpetuities, the ancient law
would have been revived in its entirety, with the exception per-
haps of the executive cy pres power under the sign manual of the
Crown.
In England, where no trust had been created and no object
specified but where there had been a general charitable intent
indicated, the Crown by virtue of the prerogative or as parens
patriae itself applied the donation to some charitable purpose.
This power was also utilized to dispose of gifts to a forbidden
religion, the Crown taking the position that these should be with-
drawn from the control of the courts. In the case of De Costa
v. De Pas's a gift to establish a Jesuba, or Jewish assembly, was
applied under the king's sign manual to the instruction of or-
phans in the tenets of the Christian religion. Such abuse of
power was largely responsible for the rejection of the doctrine
in this country.
Thus, the "Tilden Act" did not greatly alter the trend of deci-
sions in New York. A contemporary comment on the statute
and its effect upon decisional law remarked:
When a charitable corporation has power by its charter to
take and hold property to various uses, a gift to one of such
uses will not create a trust.9 Even the words "in trust" are
not conclusive of an intention to create an express trust
* * *. The dictation by the donor of the manner of its use
within the law does not affect the ownership or make the
corporation a trustee.50
or property given, granted, devised or bequeathed for such purpose shall
vest in such trustee. If no person be named as trustee then the title to
such lands or property shall vest in the Supreme Court.
"Par. 2. The Supreme Court shall have control over gifts, grants, be-
quests, and devises in all cases provided for by section one of this Act. The
attorney-general shall represent the beneficiaries in all such cases and it
shall be his duty to enforce such trusts by proper proceedings in the court."
47. N. Y. Laws of 1788. c. 46, par. 37.
48. (Ch. 1754) Anab. 228.
49. In re Look (1889) 7 N. Y. S. 298, aff'd (1891) 125 N. Y. 762, 27
N. E. 408.
50. Fowler, The Law of Charitable Uses, Tusts and Donations in New
York (1896) 115.
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In re Bogart's Will,51 decided six years after the Tilden Act,
gives clear evidence that the New York courts continued to hold
gifts and bequests to charitable corporations as absolute and not
in trust wherever possible. The gift was
* * * to the Reformed Dutch Church of North Hampstead,
to be invested in safe and productive securities * * * and the
income thereof to be applied, first, in the payment of the
salary of the pastor of said church * * * and the remainder
shall be applied to the general uses and purposes of said
church * * *,
and the court ruled:
There is an absolute gift * * *. The fact that the testator
has designated the purpose for which the legacy must be
used does not indicate a desire on his part to create a trust
* * *52
Other cases after 1893 show a similar trend.5 3 Even where
a fund was given subject to an annuity to the donor, the court
has refused to find an intent to create a trust.54 The document
was drawn with all the formalities of a declaration of trust and
was thus termed. It created an endowment fund for the college
subject to a "trust" in favor of the settlor for a portion of the
income during his life; yet the court held that the college, even
during the term of the annuity, did not hold as trustee but as
absolute owner for the particular purposes set forth in the in-
strument.
Two cases that discuss in detail the problem of construing gifts
51. (1899) 43 App. Div. 582, 60 N. Y. S. 496.
52. 60 N. Y. S. at 498.
53. Bird v. Merklee (1895) 144 N. Y. 544, 39 N. E. 645, 27 L. R. A.
423; In re Arrowsmith (Sup. Ct. 1914) 147 N. Y. S. 1016, aff'd (1915) 213
N. Y. 704, 108 N. E. 1089; Congregational Unitarian Society v. Hale (1898)
29 App. Div. 396, 51 N. Y. S. 704; Corporation of the Chamber of Com-
merce v. Bennett (Sup. Ct. 1932) 143 Misc. 513, 257 N. Y. S. 2; In re
Donchian's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1923) 120 Misc. 535, 199 N. Y. S. 107; In re
Durand (Surr. Ct. 1907) 56 Misc. 235, 107 N. Y. S. 393, aff'd (1908) 127
App. Div. 945, 111 N. Y. S. 1118; In re Griffin (1901) 167 N. Y. 71, 60
N. E. 284; In re Hart (1923) 205 App. Div. 703, 200 N. Y. S. 63; In re
Isbell's Estate (1896) 1 App. Div. 158, 37 N. Y. S. 919; In re Johnson's
Estate (Surr. Ct. 1933) 148 Misc. 218, 265 N. Y. S. 395; In re Lister's
Estate (Surr. Ct. 1937) 161 Misc. 734, 292 N. Y. S. 870; Johnson v. Hughes
(1907) 177 N. Y. 446, 80 N. E. 373; In re Roche (App. Div. 1907) 104
N. Y. S. 1138, 106 N. Y. S. 1142; St. George Church v. Morgan (Sup. Ct.
1915) 88 Misc. 702, 152 N. Y. S. 497; Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co.
(1921) 230 N. Y. 462, 130 N. E. 613; Warburton Avenue Baptist Church v.
Clark (1913) 158 App. Div. 230, 142 N. Y. S. 1089.
54. Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College (App. Div. 1906) 93 N. Y. S.
92, modified and aff'd (1906) 78 N. E. 359, 185 N. Y. 485.
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and bequests that purport to establish permanent endowment
funds, in view of the fact that the "Tilden Act" was silent on
the question of perpetuities, are of special interest.
The first 55 presented the following situation. In 1891 the Fifth
Avenue Baptist Church entered into an agreement with John
D. Rockefeller accepting certain securities to be held upon the
"trusts" and conditions that (1) the securities were to be left in
the custody of a named trust company; (2) the entire income
was to be paid to the Tabernacle Baptist Church, a second cor-
poration; (3) power of reinvestment was given to the Fifth
Avenue Church. Here, if ever, was a situation where one chari-
table corporation held merely as trustee for a second. The only
incidents of ownership vested in the Fifth Avenue Church were
those of reinvestment; it did not even have custody of the corpus.
And yet if the court held the fund to constitute a charitable trust,
it would violate the statute of perpetuities sill in force in New
York, even with reference to public trusts. Faced with this
dilemma, the court countered with:
* * * the legal effect of the agreement was to pass the
absolute title to the bonds to the Fifth Avenue Baptist
Church subject only to the payment of the income to the
plaintiff * * * and upon the conditions expressed therein
* * *. As we construe the instrument, it falls within the
class of so-called trusts arising out of gifts and bequests to
charitable and religious corporations for the promotion of
some corporate purpose, which have been held not to create
a trust, in the legal sense. Such a gift does not create a trust
in any such sense as that term is applied to property.56
A second frank admission of judicial perversion of legal con-
cepts in the desire to preserve the charity is found in an opinion
construing a testamentary gift "in trust" to an Ohio education
corporationY.1 The New York court conceded that the bequest
was, in a sense, in trust to the Ohio corporation. But a strict
construction would invalidate it as contravening the statute
against perpetuities, said the court, gifts in trust for charitable
uses having long been deemed absolute gifts, in order to enable
55. Tabernacle Baptist Church v. Fifth Avenue Baptist Church (1901)
60 App. Div. 327, 70 N. Y. S. 181, aff'd (1902) 172 N. Y. 598, 64 N. E.
1126.
56. 70 N. Y. S. at 184-185.
57. St. John v. Andrews Institute (1907) 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. E. 981;
and see Smithsonian Institution v. St. John (1909) 214 U. S. 19.
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the beneficiary of a commendable endowment, bequest or devise,
to take.
The history of the problem in Michigan parallels almost pre-
cisely that in New York. Even before the area had achieved
statehood, the legislature of the new territory broke all ties with
English statutory law by providing that "no act of the parlia-
ment of England, and no act of the parliament of Great Britain
shall have any force within the territory of Michigan. ' 8 In 1848
the state followed the New York policy by abolishing all uses
and trusts except those expressly authorized,"° and in 1907 it
adopted the New York "Tilden Act" without material modifica-
tion.60 Consequently, it is not surprising that its decisional law
duplicates the development in New York. 1
Since Wisconsin was carved from Michigan in 1836, and Con-
gress provided that the laws in force in the territory of Wis-
consin at the date of its admission as a state should continue
to be valid and operative in the new territory of Minnesota,
created in 1849, the decisions of all three states are very much
alike, although there are some vigorous cases opposing the gen-
eral trend. The majority opinion in Danfortk v. Oshkosh 2 is in
line with the New York doctrine. A testatrix had directed her
trustees to convey property to the City of Oshkosh for the pur-
pose of constructing and maintaining a public library thereon.
Of this, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said:
We can see no escape from the conclusion that this home-
stead is directed to be conveyed to the city of Oshkosh for
its own corporate use as a municipal corporation; that both
legal title and beneficial interest are held by it in the same,
to wit, its corporate capacity. Hence, no trust is imposed
upon it * * *. The decided cases are numerous * * * which
declare * * * that if the use limited is distinctively and
purely a corporate one, the corporation itself holds the bene-
ficial or equitable title, which therefore merges in the legal
title. The right of individuals interested in the use of the
property is, as members, to compel the corporation to per-
form its duties as a corporation, not as cestuis que trustent,
to regulate its conduct as a trustee. 3
58. 1 Mich. Terr. Laws (1810) 900.
59. Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) secs. 10077-85.
60. Mich. Acts of 1907, No. 122.
61. First Society M. E. Church of Newark v. Clark (1879) 41 Mich.
730; Hopkins v. Crossley (1903) 132 Mich. 612, 96 N. W. 499; Stoepel v.
Satterthwaite (1910) 162 Mich. 457, 127 N. W. 673.
62. (1904) 119 Wis. 262, 97 N. W. 258.
63. 97 N. W. at 264.
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However, this passive acceptance of New York precedents was
sharply criticized in the dissenting opinion.
Moreover, when the court was faced with an almost identical
situation some seven years later, it preferred to find that the city
took, not as absolute owner, but as trustee of a public or chari-
table trust." Property of testatrix had been given to the City
of Oshkosh for the purpose of establishing a manual training
school, clearly a corporate function of a municipal corporation.
Yet the court concluded that its former doctrine has one fatal
weakness, i. e., the problem of enforcement of the terms of the
gift or bequest. If the city takes as absolute owner, how can it
be compelled to comply with provisions of the bequest? The
court, reasoning on this point, observed:
It seems highly improbable that the testatrix had in mind
the giving of this splendid donation in a way that it might
be dissipated or disposed of for any purpose which the city
saw fit as soon as it came into possession of the property.
It is likewise improbable that the donation would have been
made had the donor understood that any such result could
legally follow. 5
But in 1920 we find the Wisconsin court apparently returning
to its former line of reasoning, again in order to preserve the
funds for the charity." The gift was
* * * to the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, upon
this express condition, that the fund so received * * * shall
always be kept separate and distinct from other funds of
said society, and that no part of the principal shall be di-
verted or used, and to be known always as the George B.
Burroughs Fund * * *
The Society claimed that upon the death of the son without law-
ful issue, the estate vested in it, charged however with the pay-
ment by it of an annuity, while the trustees for 'the estate argued
that the Society's charter did not authorize it to act as trustee.
Thus, the issue was drawn. If trusteeship in the technical
sense was ultra vires the corporation, to hold the fund a chari-
table trust was to render it lost to charity notwithstanding the
provisions of the will as to the perpetual character and isolation
of the fund, and despite a factor of greater significance, that
during the life of the annuitant, it could scarcely be said that
64. Maxcy v. City of Oshkosh (1910) 144 Wis. 238, 128 N. W. 899.
65. 128 N. W. at 904.
66. State Historical Society v. Foster (Wis. 1920) 177 N. W. 16.
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the entire legal and equitable interest in the fund vested in the
corporation, according to traditional legal concepts; yet the court
felt constrained to hold that the corporation was absolute owner
of the fund and that the payment of such an annuity was not
the performance of trust duties.
One excerpt from a fairly recent Minnesota case67 may suffice
to indicate how far that state has been content to follow along
with New York. The court was considering a bequest in the fol-
lowing terms:
I give, devise and bequeath in trust to the State Conven-
tion of Universalists of the State of Minnesota all of the
property * * * of which I shall die seized. All the income
and profit arising from the estate to be used * * * to pay
* * * the salary of the minister who may be located where
said graves are located * *
The court announced that
Weight may be given to the fact that respondent is a
religious corporation * * * organized for religious, educa-
tional and benevolent purposes * . It is really a gift or
devise to respondent direct, to be used according to its
known general practice. The use of the words "in trust"
should be attributed to hazy notions of legal terms.,8
Other decisions show a similar pattern of judicial reasoning.0
C. Summary of the Virginia-New York Doctrines
The foregoing historical survey would seem to justify the con-
clusion that in those states where the Statute of Elizabeth was
rejected and the inherent power of equity over charitable uses
denied, either by direct statutory expression of policy or by
judicial interpretation of English precedents, the courts were
compelled to evolve the doctrine that gifts and bequests to a
charitable corporation for one or more corporate purposes be-
come the absolute property of the corporation and are not held
67. In re Little's Estate (Minn. 1919) 173 N. W. 659.
68. Id. at 660.
69. Wells v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 8, 1933) 63 F.(2d) 425; Atwater v. Russell (1892) 49 Minn. 57, 51 N. W. 629; Cone v.
Wold (1902) 85 Minn. 302, 88 N. W. 977; In re Henrickson's Estate (1925)
163 Minn. 176, 203 N. W. 778; Lane v. Easton (1897) 69 Minn. 141, 71
N. W. 1031, 38 L. R. A. 669; In re Minneapolis Police Dept. Relief Ass'n
(1902) 85 Minn. 302, 88 N. W. 977; Peterson v. Northwestern Baptist Hos-
pital (1935) 194 Minn. 399, 260 N. W. 512; Shanahan v. Kelly (1903) 88
Minn. 202, 92 N. W. 948; Watkins v. Bigelow (1904) 93 Minn. 210, 100
N. W. 1104; Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Horn (1913) 120 Minn. 404,
139 NX. W. 905.
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by it "in trust," in the technical sense of that phrase, as applied
by the courts in the field of private trusts. Even after substan-
tial statutory modification of earlier limitations, a definite ten-
dency to follow former habits of reasoning is apparent. Some
courts in these jurisdictions have been concerned with the prob-
lem of enforcement of conditions and restrictions, but the major-
ity seemingly have been content to dismiss the discussion with
the convenient word, "precatory."
IV. NON-ABOLITION OF THE ENGLISH DOCTRINE
Where the English doctrine of charitable uses is rejected, the
general problem under discussion is relatively simple. Charitable
corporations are not, and apparently cannot become, trustees for
the funds given to them for purposes within the scope of their
charters.
However, the majority of states have accepted the English
doctrine, some by specific enactment, others by general adoption
of English statutes passed prior to 1606, and a few by judicial
recognition without legislative support. In these jurisdictions,
the problem is more difficult. Having recognized the broad pow-
ers of equity in the field of charitable uses, the courts in these
states were free to apply the general concepts of trusteeship to
both charitable and private trusts. Consequently, there was not
the same necessity for maintaining a distinction between cor-
porate and unincorporated charities.
As a result of this historical development, we find many cases
in which the court clearly recognizes the charitable corporation
as trustee of its endowments. On the other hand some courts
within this same group have apparently failed to take this differ-
ence in historical evolution into consideration and have not hesi-
tated to apply the Virginia-New York doctrine despite prior ac-
ceptance and adoption of the Statute of Charitable Uses. Mis-
souri, because of early acceptance of the Statute, furnishes a
good example of the confusion resulting from the application of
conflicting concepts.
A. The Problem in Missouri
Missouri adopted the Statute of Elizabeth some five years be-
fore statehood.70 However, the Missouri courts have preferred
70. "Our statute of the 19th of January 1816 introduced 'the common
law of England, which is of general nature, and all statutes made by the
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to rest their doctrine of charities upon the inherent powers of
equity rather than the statute, looking to the preamble of the
statute merely for guidance in delimiting the area of applica-
tion of the doctrine. The early case of Chambers v. St. Louis"1
contains a valuable summary of the subject and lays down the
main framework of the doctrine for Missouri:
The statute has been resorted to as a guide, because it
furnishes the largest enumeration of just and meritorious
charitable uses; and it may perhaps be rather considered as
a declaratory law, or specification of previously recognized
charities, than as creating, as some cases have intimated,
the objects of chancery jurisdiction over charities.72
If the Statute of 43rd Elizabeth had been repealed in this
state, we must confess we would have been embarrassed in
endeavoring to uphold a charity which differed in any mate-
rial respect from any other lawful trust. Although it might
be argued that the repeal of the statute would not affect the
common law, yet the two subjects are so closely joined, giv-
ing and receiving aid from each other, that such a measure
could not fail to influence the judgment, and be regarded as
evidence of the indifference if not the hostility with which
the subject was viewed by the legislature. In declining to be
governed by opinions formed from such considerations, we
do not disparage the courts by which they were delivered
nor diminish in anywise the respect to which they are de-
servedly entitled.73
With this background courts of Missouri were rarely called
upon to make any real distinction between gifts to charitable
corporations subject to limitations and restrictions and the crea-
tion of a charitable trust with the corporation as trustee. The
gift or bequest was valid, whether sustained as an absolute gift
or as a charitable trust. The cases are numerous wherein the
court either terms such gifts "charitable trusts" or applies gen-
eral principles of trust law to them without discussion as to
their precise status.7 4
British Parliament in aid of, or to supply the defects of the common law,
made prior to the 4th year of James I, and of a general nature and not
local to that kingdom.'" Chambers v. St. Louis (1860) 29 Mo. 543, 586.
71. (1860) 29 Mo. 543.
72. Id. at 588.
73. Id. at 582-583.
74. Academy of the Visitation v. St. Clemens (1872) 50 Mo. 167; Barkly
v. Donnelly (1892) 112 Mo. 561, 19 S. W. 305; Buckly v. Monck (Mo.
1916) 187 S. W. 31; Catron v. Scarritt Collegiate Institute (1915) 264
Mo. 713, 175 S. W. 571; Crow v. Clay County (1906) 196 Mo. 234, 95 S. W.369; Cummings v. Dent (Mo. 1916) 189 S. W. 1161; Eads v. Y. M. C. A.
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That this broad doctrine has failed to compel the Missouri
courts to sharpen their usage of terms is well illustrated by the
case of Society of the Holy Sous v. Law.75 The will of the testa-
trix gave certain property "to the order of The Little Helpers
of the Holy Souls." This was the name by which both an unin-
corporated order and a charitable and religious corporation were
known. The devise to the unincorporated order could only be
sustained as a charitable trust, whereas the same property to a
charitable corporation could be considered as an outright gift.
The court refused to meet the issue:
It necessarily follows, under the equitable principle which
conserves a charitable devise, that the one made by the tes-
tatrix became effective either in the unincorporated society
* * * or in the corporate body equally denoted by the same
term. 76
It is clear that in the states that have always accepted the
English doctrine of charitable trusts, the trustee of such a trust
may be a corporation7T-a charitable corporation or even a mu-
nicipal corporation.- Because of its artificial nature and re-
stricted powers as contrasted with the natural status and unre-
stricted capacities of natural persons, a corporation cannot be-
come the trustee of a charitable trust repugnant to or incon-
sistent with its charter provisions. Since it may also take as
absolute owner, it becomes important to determine the true in-
tent of the donor or testator. The tendency of courts in states
where charitable trusts are invalid to find that the intent of the
donor was to make an absolute gift, despite the use of words
normally indicative of trust intent has already been discussed.
Cases are not lacking to show the influence of these decisions in
states where the charitable trust is fully recognized.79 Prac-
tically all courts have held that, where the gift or bequest was
(1930) 325 Mo. 577, 29 S. W. (2d) 701; Farm & Home Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Armstrong (1935) 337 Mo. 349, 85 S. W. (2d) 461; Society of the
Helpers of the Holy Souls v. Law (1916) 267 Mo. 667, 186 S. W. 718.
75. (1916) 267 Mo. 667, 186 S. W. 718.
76. 186 S. W. at 727.
77. Note (1915) 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 715.
78. Note (1889) 5 L. R. A. 858.
79. Eccles v. R. I. Hospital Trust Co. (1916) 90 Conn. 592, 98 Ati. 129;
Greek Orthodox Community v. Malicourtis (1929) 267 Mass. 472, 166 N. E.
863; St. James Parish v. Bagly (1905) 138 N. C. 384, 50 S. E. 841, 70
L. R. A. 160; Clark v. Sisters of Society of the Holy Child Jesus (1908)
82 Neb. 85, 117 N. W. 107.
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to the corporation, without restrictions, limitations, or sugges-
tions as to its use, no trust was imposed. But if the donor should
see fit to impose some restriction upon the discretion otherwise
vested in the board of the corporation, will this be sufficient to
cut down absolute ownership to that of mere legal title? If
preferences and suggestions may be dismissed as merely preca-
tory, how far must the words of instruction or command cut
into the area of discretion before the courts will find all the ele-
ments of a technical trust? If the use is limited to only one of
several functions or purposes of the corporation, will this be
sufficient? Or must we accept the test suggested by the Nebraska
court in Hobbs v. Board of Northern Baptist Convention," dis-
cussed at the beginning of this article, that all gifts and be-
quests intended as permanent endowments are to be construed
as trusts? Just what words are necessary to transmute an other-
wise absolute gift to a charitable corporation into a charitable
trust is really the crux of the problem.81
The inquiry may well commence with National Board v. Fry.82
There an executor brought an action to construe the following
provision in the will:
Item Eleven: I give and bequeath my residence property
* * * and my diamond brooch to the National Board of
Christian Women's Board of Missions of the Christian
Church of the United States of America * * * for home
mission work in the United States as they, the said board,
may think best * * * the same to be received and handled
and used as the W. H. French Memorial Fund for said
mission work.
It would seem that the phrase "for home mission work in the
United States" restricts sharply the area of discretion of the
Board. Otherwise, it would have been free to use it for mission-
ary work in any part of the world, or for the general expenses
of the organization. Yet we find the Supreme Court of Missouri
denying that the words imposed restrictions:
Item 11 devises the residence property to plaintiff, not
upon a trust, but absolutely and without reservation or limi-
tation * * *. The devise is not in the nature of a charitable
trust. It is a clear gift. There are no words in the devise
to raise or create a trust; hence there is no trust declared
80. (Neb. 1934) 253 N. W. 627.
81. Note (1906) 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1119.
82. (1922) 293 Mo. 399, 239 S. W. 519.
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* * *. If the devise created a charitable trust, its object and
purpose would have to be clear, definite and certain. In such
case the words of creation must announce a definite subject
and a definite object, and the terms of the trust must be
sufficiently declared * * *. Under no conceivable circum-
stances could a court be called upon to administer this fund
any more than if the devise had been to John Doe.8 3
The court might well have applied these same tests to the facts
of the case and reached an opposite result. The object and pur-
pose of the bequest were quite definite. The beneficiaries them-
selves must of necessity be indefinite, to some extent, since this
is one of the primary characteristics of a charitable trust. 4 The
corporation was impliedly forbidden to merge the fund in its
general accounts since it was commanded to receive, handle, and
use it "as the W. H. French Memorial Fund." How much further
must a donor go in order to create a technical trust, if such be
her intention?
The last sentence quoted from the opinion is significant. Sup-
pose the Board had been inclined to disregard these instructions
and limitations and had indicated an intent to expend the fund
for general expenses. Is there no legal process available in Mis-
souri to restrain such breach of faith? The attorney general, as
representative of the interests of the general public, might inter-
vene,85 but what would be the nature of the action if this is not
a charitable trust? The payment of general operating expenses
is not in itself a violation of any of the terms of the charter of
a charitable corporation. If the fund is really the absolute prop-
erty of the board, how can anyone, even the state, question the
manner of its expenditure so long as the corporation stays with-
in the provisions of its charter powers? Some courts have said
that a gift for only one of the corporate purposes is made on
condition that it be applied to the corporate use specified ;8 but
what the procedure would be if the condition were broken is a
nice question. Courts are hostile to forfeitures and consequently
to conditions subsequent."
83. 2.9 S. W. at 524.
84. Note (1938) 23 WASHTNGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 556. But cf. 2
Borert. Trusts (1935) sec. 362.
85. 2 Bovert, Trusts (1935) sec. 411.
86. Snowden v. Crown Cork & Seal Co. (1911) 114 Md. 650, 80 Atl.
510; Conner v. Trinity Reformed Church (1916) 129 Md. 360, 99 Atl. 547;
FitzGerald v. Big Rapids (1900) 123 Mich. 281, 82 N. W. 56.
87. Newton v. Newton Burial Park (1930) 326 Mo. 901. 34 S. W. (2d)
118; In re Jordan's Estate (1933) 310 Pa. 401, 165 AtI. 652.
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In 191988 the court again manifested an inclination to accept
at least a portion of the Virginia-New York doctrine. The heirs
of deceased requested the court to construe the following para-
graphs of his will:
Seventh. One of such third parts I give and bequeath to
the capital of the public school fund of the State of Mis-
souri * * *
Justice Walker, speaking for the majority of the court, said:
The word "capital" as used to designate the recipients of
these bequests has no significance other than that generally
given to it as applied to public or private funds * ".
Neither directly or by reasonable implications is a donee
designated who can take the legal title to the funds be-
queathed and thus authorize the appointment of a trustee
* * * 89
The court then concluded that the bequest could not be sustained
as a direct gift to the school fund and was therefore void except
on the theory that these bequests created charitable trusts for
the advancement of education. So construed, the provisions of
the will in controversy, aided by the cy pres doctrine, might be
upheld, and as a consequence, the powers of a court of equity
exercised in the designation of a trustee. To quote:
In the creation of a charitable trust, it is essential that
there be a separation of the legal estate from the beneficial
enjoyment of the same * * *. This separation must be indi-
cated by the words of the donor, otherwise the equitable
and legal estate will meet in the same person, and the trust
will be extinguished by a merger of the equitable in the legal
estate. The rule thus plainly put finds affirmative expression
in Doan v. Vestry, 103 Md. 662, 64 Atl. 314, 7 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1119 * * *. If such a trust has been created, it will
not be permitted to fail because a trustee has been errone-
ously or uncertainly designated, but the court in the exercise
of its inherent equity jurisdiction will appoint one * * ". The
question here confronting us has a deeper significance, in
that the will does not, either by express terms or by impli-
cation, create such a trust * * *.go
The primary significance of this decision is the readiness of
the court to cite a leading Maryland case on the point that a
88. Robinson v. Crutcher (1919) 277 Mo. 1, 209 S. W. 104, (1921) 21 U.
of Mo. Bull. L. Ser. 31.
89. 209 S. W. at 106.
90.- Id. at 105, 107.
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charitable bequest is to be construed as a direct or absolute gift
unless there is a clear intent to cut down the interest granted,
i. e., a separation of the legalestate from the beneficial enjoy-
ment.
Justice Williams, speaking for the minority, was of the opin-
ion that there was an intent to make such separation of inter-
ests:
By the terms of the will the legal estate in the property
* * * became immediately vested in the statutory custodian
of the respective school funds, and the equitable title or
beneficial enjoyment thereof is vested in the persons who
by statutory law become now, or are hereafter, entitled to
receive the benefits from the respective school funds.-
In 19361-2 the Supreme Court of Missouri was again called upon
to construe a will of this character, with almost identical pro-
visions:
2nd. I give devise and bequeath the remaining part of my
estate both real and personal to the Macon County Missouri
school funds.
By a unanimous decision, the court rgversed itself, concluding
that the minority opinion in the Crutcher case correctly stated
the law applicable and that a valid charitable trust had been
created.
It is obvious that this decision does not necessarily reflect the
attitude of the court with reference to gifts and bequests to
charitable corporations. School funds as such are not corporate
entities, and a court might be reluctant to sustain a bequest as
a direct gift to such a fund and yet be willing to hold that a
similar bequest to a charitable corporation with fully defined
charter powers need not constitute a charitable trust. In other
words the Burrier case clearly overrules the Crutcher case but
should not be accepted as a complete reversal of the tendency
shown in the Fry case. This view is reinforced by the court's
observation that "what was said in Doan v. Vestry * * * to
the separation of the legal and equitable estates was perfectly
proper." 3' Indeed the court quoted the major portion of the Doan
decision again and apparently concurred in the view that the
91. Id. at 107.
92. Burrier v. Jones (1936) 338 Mo. 679, 92 S. W. (2d) 885; see Note
(1936) 1 Mo. L. Rev. 369.
93. 92 S. W. (2d) at 889.
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intention to vest merely the legal and not the equitable or bene-
ficial interest in the charitable corporation must be deduced from
rational analysis of the will and not from abstract speculation.
It justified repudiation of the Crutcher case by pointing out
that, since Missouri has accepted the English common law of
charities almost in its entirety, it may well adopt a broader view
of the power of equity to frame a scheme or plan to administer
gifts merely "to charity" or "to the poor" without mention of
the trust or trustee.
It is the failure of the Crutcher case to adopt this more liberal
concept of the inherent powers of equity to frame administrative
schemes for gifts to "charity" in general and not its apparent
acceptance of the Virginia-Maryland-New York doctrine with
reference to direct gifts to charitable corporations that is criti-
cized by Professor Bogert as "contra and less desirable."'11
In support of the view that charitable corporations in Mis-
souri hold their endowment funds as trustees and not as abso-
lute owners may be cited the case of Catron v. Scarritt Col-
legiate Institute.9" The provisions of the will in question read:
I do give and grant * * * unto the Scarritt Collegiate
Institute, a corporation, * * * for the use and benefit of
said institute of learning, especially for the endowment of
the president's chair in memory of my deceased son, J.
Winston Hall * * * which proceeds are to be applied by
said corporation to the object hereinafter stated.
The Scarritt Institute ceased to attract students, and its board
decided to merge with the Morrisville College. An attempt was
made to induce the board to return the endowment to the Hall
family in order that they might erect a church in memory of
the son. The court objected to the return of the fund, holding:
* * * that it was the purpose of the grantor * * * to vest
in the grantee a charitable trust * * * for educational pur-
poses and that this donation created a public charity.
* * * to permit the fund to be used for the erection of a
memorial church would be to contravene the expressed pur-
poses of the gift. The fund, being for educational purposes,
must, in the exercise of judicial cy pres, be turned over to
the Scarritt-Morrisville College * * *. If necessary to ac-
complish these directions, the attorney-general may become
a party to a proper proceeding.'6
94. 2 Bogert, Trusts (1935) sec. 434, n. 69.
95. (1915) 264 Mo. 713, 175 S. W. 571.
96. 175 S. W. at 574, 575.
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It is submitted that the same result could have been attained
without the holding that the fund constituted a charitable trust.
The court might well have said that the institute, during its cor-
porate life, held the fund as absolute owner, restricted only by
the provisions of its charter that the funds be devoted to edu-
cation. Upon its dissolution,97 the attorney-general should repre-
sent the public interest in the fund and see that it is devoted
to the same or similar purposes, since there are no stockholders
to receive the net assets, as would be the case of the dissolution
of an ordinary corporation. Nevertheless, the attention of the
court was not directed to the possible advantages of such a solu-
tion, and the case stands squarely in the path of any theory that
charitable corporations in Missouri are vested with absolute
title to their endowment funds. The Fry case came five years
later, but it did not expressly overrule the holding in this case.
Other decisions of similar import may be found.,-
The so-called "trust fund doctrine" adhered to by Missouri and
other courts to justify tort immunity of charitable corporations
also suggests the view that such corporations do not hold their
funds as absolute owners. The recent case of Eads v. Y. M.
C. A. 99 illustrates the trend.
The decision of the courts 00 to grant this degree of tort im-
munity to charitable corporations need not rest upon any doc-
trine of charitable trusts. One may say that all charitable organ-
izations hold their funds "in trust" for the general purposes of
the charity for which admittedly they are organized without
such holding constituting a technical trust. In fact, many courts
prefer to base such immunity on the theory that public policy
requires the exemption on the broad ground that public encour-
97. Comment (1936) 21 Cor. L. Q. 96; Comment (1926) 20 Ill. L. Rev.
842; Comment (1927) 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 177.
98. Buckly v. Monek (Mo. 1916) 187 S. W. 31; Crow v. Clay County
(1906) 196 Mo. 234, 95 S. W. 369; Cummings v. Dent (Mo. 1916) 189
S. W. 1161.
99. (1930) 325 Mo. 577, 29 S. W. (2d) 701. The trust fund theory holds
that the funds of institutions constitute a trust fund for charitable pur-
poses of the organization which may not be diverted to the payment of
claims for damages for injuries due to negligence of agents of the institu-
tion. thereby depleting the fund.
100. See for illustrative cases Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon
College (C. C. A. 4, 1929) 31 F. (2d) 869; Adams v. University Hospital
(1907) 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453; Roberts v. Kirksville College of
Osteopathy & Surgery (Mo. 1929) 16 S. W. (2d) 625; Vermillion v. Wo-
man's College of Due West (1916) 104 S. C. 197, 88 S. E. 649.
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agement of such institutions should be extended to protect them
from tort responsibility. Nevertheless, the language of the courts
of Missouri and other states on this subject cannot be entirely
disregarded.
C. The Rule in Other Jurisdictions
A brief survey of decisions in other states which, like Missouri,
have accepted the English law of charities, will show a high
degree of conflict and confusion. These are summarized by juris-
dictions in the appendix to this article.
V. THE PROBLEM CONFRONTING FINANCIAL OFFICERS OF
CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS
A. Lack of Adequate Precedents
Until the courts have spoken more fully, it will be difficult to
advise the financial officers and directors of charitable corpora-
tions as to the precise character of their endowment funds, espe-
cially those subject to material restrictions as to use of income,
except in states that have accepted the Virginia-New York doc-
trine of absolute ownership. The viewpoint expressed in the
Restatement'0 is constructive, but seems to be based largely
upon the general doctrine evolved through judicial necessity in
Virginia, New York, and other states of this group. The histori-
cal development of this doctrine has been shown.
Although some courts in jurisdictions recognizing the inherent
power of equity over charities have accepted the doctrine of
absolute ownership, at least with reference to gifts without re-
strictions, the cases cited in support of this viewpoint are gen-
erally those from the original group of states where the doctrine
was evolved. Moreover, the doctrine is usually relied upon where
it is necessary to preserve the charity, without rationalization.
B. Possible Inhibition of Future Gifts
Since one of the primary objectives of the American Law
Institute in drafting the general restatement of the common law
101. Restatement, Trusts (1935) sec. 348, Introductory Note. See note
2, supra. The comments of the editor of the Restatement on this point are
of interest: "On the broad question whether a charitable corporation is
trustee for charitable purposes, the language of the cases is conflicting.
The reason why we made the statement which we made in the Restate-
-ment * * * is that we were dealing with trusts strictly so called, and did
not wish to lay down the rule that the same principles are always ap-
plicable to charitable corporations, since the rules governing charitable cor-
porations were not within the scope of the Restatement but were to be
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is the expectation that the trend of future decisional, if not
statutory, law will be influenced thereby, it may not be entirely
inappropriate to consider the possible effects of a general ac-
ceptance of the viewpoint that charitable corporations hold their
funds, even restricted endowment funds, as absolute owners.
In the opinion of university and college business officers with
whom this question has been discussed, donors might well hesi-
tate to make funds available in the future if the courts should
declare unambiguously that restricted endowments, as well as
unrestricted gifts, are expendable at the discretion of the govern-
ing boards of charitable corporations. Further, such unfettered
power would, in their opinion, be apt to alter the permanent and
enduring character of such institutions and thus rob them of
their greatest appeal to those desirous of perpetuating a name
or memory. °2 -
treated in some subsequent restatement. We therefore left open the ques-
tion how far the same principles might be applicable." Correspondence,
Dec. 14, 1937.
102. "The paragraph from the restatement may be a sound rule for the
courts to adopt in appropriate factual situations. * * * The idea, however,
that the donor of a fund to a state university who diltects the investment
of the principal and the use of the income for a stated purpose would view
with equanimity the news that the donee treated the principal as well as
the income as an unrestricted gift appears to me to be an unwarranted
and unsafe assumption of complacency in the giver of the gift. If it were
to be known that the University of Illinois, in situations of the type
described, treated the gifts as its absolute property and not encumbered
in any sense with a trust, I am clearly of the opinion that friends who
otherwise might have considered donations for purposes near their hearts
would hesitate and probably place their bounty elsewhere. * * * In any
event, I do not know of a single gift of the type we are discussing made
to the University of Illinois which I could be willing to advise the Board
of Trustees to treat as absolute and not impressed with a trust character.
I should, * * * unless the circumstances be very clear to the effect that
the gift is absolute, advise the Board to take the matter into court and
obtain a formal adjudication which would protect that body against future
challenge." Mr. Sveinbjorn Johnson, general counsel for the University of
Illinois, in correspondence of Dec. 7, 1937.
Another recent comment on this problem is that of Mr. J. Harvey Cain
of the American Council on Education in (1938) 47 School and Society
442-443: "I have noticed a growing tendency on the part of college admin-
istrators to disregard, or at least not to hold so sacred as in the past, the
obligations expressed or implied in the acceptance of gifts and bequests
for endowment, plant, and annunity funds. I have particularly in mind
the guarding of the principal of these funds. We should recall that most
of these capital funds have been solicited from benefactors to whom we
have presented many and compelling reasons for the necessity of their
generosity. The greatest appeal of all, however, is based upon the assump-
tion that a great university endures. * * * These great institutions have
tranquilly survived through the centuries while governments have fallen
into decay. What has now suddenly happened? Have we, like little Vir-
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C. Need for Flexibility in the Administration of Funds
On the other hand, what are the advantages to the charitable
corporations and to the charities they serve of an opposite point
of view? If these funds are to be considered technical trusts,
are they subject to all the restrictions and limitations that are
ginia who questioned the existence of Santa Claus, become affected by the
skepticism of a skeptical age? Have we, too, become inoculated with new
political doctrines? Shall we destroy the very foundations of our endowed
institutions and pass on our obligations to future generations? * * *"
"* * * A man high in academic circles told me recently that he thought
the action of certain college presidents in selling their endowment, in order
to keep the doors of opportunity open for our young college men and wo-
men, was to be highly commended. My tongue was nearly tied in rebuttal
and I could only think of replying that I did not think the end justified
the means. * * * It will greatly discourage if not completely stop generous
benefactions to our institutions, and the bad example of a comparatively
few will work to the detriment of many. * * * One little friendly law suit,
and it is bound to come, will send them all scurrying to amend their newly
accepted policies and to rebuild their financial structures. * * *"
In this connection one should bear in mind another sentence from the
Restatement, supra. "The Attorney General can maintain a suit not only
to enforce a charitable corporation to apply property held by it to the
charitable purposes for which it is given to the corporation." This may be
true, but if the funds are in reality the absolute property of the corpora-
tion, as many of the decisions seem to hold, and if the gift was not made
upon condition subsequent, just what is the nature of the legal obligation
that is sought to be enforced? If the corporation is applying the funds to
the general purposes of its charter, it is not in direct violation of that
charter, see Note (1929) 62 A. L. R. 573; Note (1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev.
891, unless the court can read into its provisions the covenant that it will
apply all funds precisely as directed by the donor.
A recent unpublished thesis on the question of the purchase of common
stocks for trust funds in Missouri summarizes the question of the purchase
of equities by the trustee of a technical trust in Missouri as follows:
"Whether or not he may invest in stocks has as yet been undecided, but it
is probable, in view of the legislative policy of the state and the liberal
tendency of the courts, that Missouri will adopt the more desirable Massa-
chusetts rule, which permits investment in stocks if the trustee has exer-
cised due diligence in their selection." Biggs, The Investment of Trust
Funds in Missouri (Unpublished thesis in Washington University Law
Library, 1937).
Barnes Hospital in St. Louis is administered as a technical trust and
not as a charitable corporation, there being three individual trustees named
in accordance with the will of the original donor. Recently these trustees
applied to the circuit court for advice, stating that the will of Robert A.
Barnes did not sufficiently direct them in the investment of the endowment
funds valued at approximately $1,200,000. The attorney for the trustees
were instructed by the court to draft a decree permitting the trustees to
invest the endowment funds in sound, high-grade corporation stocks and
bonds. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, March 18, 1938.
Must the directors of a charitable corporation in this same jurisdiction
request the guidance of equity on this point, or are they safe in relying on
the doctrine that the corporation is not trustee for its own endowments?
The question can be answered when the courts have spoken more explicitly.
The editor of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts comments as follows:
"There are two questions which have been troubling trustees of charitable
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associated with the investment and administration of private
trusts?
During the dynamic changes of the past two decades, there
has grown up a demand for greater flexibility in the adminis-
tration of all funds. It is argued that educational and charitable
institutions recently. One is the question whether a charitable corporation
in making investments of its funds is limited to investments which are legal
for private trustees. The other question is whether if funds are given to
them for different specific purposes, they are justified in investing the funds
with their other funds and allocating the interest. Curiously enough, I
have been unable to find much authority on these questions. When Ex-
President Hoover raised the question as to the investment of the funds
of Stanford University, the court held that it was proper to invest in
shares of stock. The court, however, went on the broad ground that in
California investment in shares of stock was a proper trust investment.
It seems to be held that where funds are held by individual trustees for
charitable purposes, the trustees are bound by the rules applicable to
trustees of private trusts. See Schroeder v. American National Red Cross,
254 N. W. 371 (Wisconsin 1934). It is not clear, however, whether these
restrictions on investments are applicable to charitable corporations, either
with respect to their unrestricted funds, or with respect to fund given for
a specific purpose." Correspondence of December 14, 1937.
Reasoning by analogy may furnish a partial solution, but analogies have
a disappointing way of disintegrating under the impact of actual court
decisions.
At the meeting of the Association of Business Officers of Universities
and Colleges, held at Chicago in May, 1937, E. S. Erwin, Assistant Comp-
troller of Stanford University, presented a paper on "The Policy of Merged
Investments and their Legal Aspects." His final paragraphs in summariza-
tion are as follows:
"The legal aspects of investing in stocks and the mingling of the invest-
ments of endowments of educational trusts of necessity must be treated
in an abstract way because so far as I know there are no Supreme Court
decisions dealing directly with the problem. It might seem strange that
during the many years that educational trusts have been operating there
would be no law dealing directly with the problem. However, when one stops
to consider the fact that generally only the attorney general, or other
public officer, a co-trustee, or person who has a special interest in the invest-
ment of the educational trust has power to intervene in the management of
such trusts, it is not surprising that there are so few cases of record.
"I think it can be assumed that all educational trusts are managed with
diligence, prudence, and honesty, and therefore there has been no occasion
for the attorney general to question the administration of such trusts. Per-
sons having a special interest in the investment of an educational trust
are few. ("Power of Donor's Heirs to Enforce Charitable Trust" (1928),
14 Mass. L. Q. 50, 37 Yale L. J. 533, 62 A. L. R. 881) and it can be pre-
sumed that in those instances where such a person may have a complaint as
to the investment procedure of an educational trust, such a complaint no
doubt has been settled by negotiation and agreement.
"While the law (in many states) explicity prohibits the mingling of the
investments of trust funds in the possession of commercial or private trusts,
I do not hesitate to express my confidence that the policy of educational
institutions of mingling endowment investments when there are no restric-
tive features to the contrary in the deed of grant would be upheld by the
courts. I think any institution that sets up adequate safeguards to protect
the principal of the original gift and at the same time can show that the
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institutions should have the power to protect themselves against
the dangers of inflation through the purchase of common stock
for their endowments. Wider diversification is also essential for
stability of income and preservation of principal. Must the trus-
tees of a charitable corporation apply to the courts for permis-
sion to invest in equities? Do institutions have the right to
merge the investment of the principal of their various endow-
ments in order to afford this diversification to the smaller funds?
These are vital questions of administration which the courts as
yet have failed to answer with any degree of clarity.
D. Merger of Investments
On the question of the power of charitable corporation to
merge its funds, the established practice of representative insti-
tutions may have some weight with the courts when they are
confronted in the future with the necessity of formulating specific
rules of law. An analysis of the financial reports of a number
of universities and foundations, and correspondence with their
financial officers, indicates that practically all follow the proce-
dure of merging the investment of all funds unless inhibited by
the specific prohibitions of the instrument of gift.103
income to which the fund was entitled had been expended for the purpose
for which the gift was made can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the
court that the practice was sound, and that the provisions of the various
trusts have not been violated."
On the general question as to the authority of a trustee to pool the in-
vestments of individual trusts held by him, see Note (1936) 103 A. L. R.
1192. A recent (December 27, 1937) regulation of the Federal Reserve Board
sheds some light on the situation. The following is taken from the Asso-
ciated Press Dispatch of the same date: "The Federal Reserve Board an-
nounced today regulations under which banks in states which permit com-
mon trust funds can get federal tax exemption for the funds. A common
trust fund was defined as one maintained by a national bank exclusively
for the collective investment of money contributed by the bank in its capac-
ity as trustee, executor, administrator or guardian. States permitting com-
mon trust funds include New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Minne-
sota, Delaware and Vermont. The revenue act of 1936 provided exemptions
-for such funds if they met requirements set by the Board. Income from
the funds is to be taxed through pro rata levies against the participants
in each fund and not against the fund itself."
103. A recent communication (December 9, 1937) from Henry L. Shat-
tuck, Treasurer of Harvard College, is of interest in this connection: "We
have a general investment account in which most of our funds are invested.
We also have funds which are specifically invested in whole or in part.
These consist of two classes of funds, the first being those which under
their terms are specifically required to be specifically invested, and the
second being funds which are for the time being wholly or partly separately
invested by reason of the receipt of securities or real estate which we do
not desire to add to our general investment account. * * * In general the
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VI. CONCLUSION
Until the courts have had the issue clearly presented to them
and have spoken in more precise terminology, the trustees and
directors of charitable corporations in states accepting the En-
glish doctrine would do well to exercise a high degree of pru-
dence, and should be meticulous in observing the provisions and
line we draw is that if under the terms of gift it is stated that the fund
must be kept and invested as a separate fund, we carry it as a separate
investment. On the other hand, if the terms go no further than to say
that the fund is to be kept separate we consider that this does not require
separate investment. Every fund is kept separately on our books whether
separately invested or not, and in the annual report there is a list of the
funds giving the principal sum to the credit of each and the income and
the disposition of the income."
The policy of the University of Chicago on this point is stated by H. H.
Moore, of the legal department in the office of the treasurer of the Univer-
sity: "Our own policy, particularly as related to investments, has been based
for many years on the theory that a legal trust cannot be said to exist in
the legal sense when the legal and equitable interests are merged. Within
the past few months in fact the question arose in connection with the pooling
of much the greater part of our endowment investments previously held
in separate accounts, and this action was largely based upon the acceptance
of this principle." Correspondence of December 23, 1937.
In 1929, the University of Chicago requested an opinion from William
R. Conklin of New York City. The following is an extract from his brief
of some thirty pages of citations: "It is my opinion, therefore, that so far
as the law is concerned these corporations do not hold their property as
trusts and, therefore, are not subject to the law of investments of trust
funds; and further that there is no prohibition in the corporation law
against investments in any class of securities; but probably we should go
further than the strict legal interpretation of this situation. * * * Safety
of principal and reasonable income must always be the ideal in regard to
investments. In fact it seems that they must follow the rules laid down
by our courts for investment of trusts where broad discretionary powers
are given to trustees in express trusts." This opinion is to be read in the
light of the strong position New York courts have alvays taken on this
subiect.
The general procedure of Columbia University is illustrated by the
following comment of Douglas S. Gibbs, Assistant Treasurer: "Whenever
possible it is our policy to 'pool' our investments which is, we presume, an
answer to your question regarding 'merged vs. unmerged endowment funds.'
When the income from a fund is payable to outside parties for a given
time and in other cases where 'pooling' of the fund is not permitted or
feasible, we invest the fund in particular securities. Of our 'Special En-
dowments' which total $39,418,484.23 about $29,000,000 is invested in our
'pool account.'" Correspondence of December 14, 1937.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology has also adopted this same policy,
as indicated by the comments of its treasurer, Horace S. Ford: "In the
matter of gifts, we do not take the position here that every gift, subject to
restrictions as to use of income, constitutes a technical trust and renders
its administration subject to the rules applicable to charitable trusts. Massa-
chusetts laws give considerable scope both to trustees and to the trustees
of educational and charitable institutions. If they can show that they
have followed the course that they as prudent men would have followed
in their own behalf, there appears to be little disposition to question such
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limitations expressed in the bequests and deeds of gift, applying
to the courts for guidance where the language is ambiguous or
where conditions have radically changed. The liquidation of
securities donated for permanent endowment in order to benefit
the present generation is to be condemned, not only as inexpedi-
ent and as contrary to the best interests of endowed education
and charity but also as a dangerous reliance upon the language
of the courts where they have referred to the title of the insti-
tution as "absolute." It is to be hoped that future development
of judicial theory in this field will evolve adequate restraints
upon administrators without cutting too sharply into the area of
proper discretion.
APPENDIX. A SURVEY OF DECISIONS IN OTHER STATES
1. Alabama
A general statute' accepting that portion of the common law applicable
to its needs and conditions placed Alabama among the group of states rec-
ognizing the English doctrine of charities, and a recent case would lead to
the belief that she prefers to adhere to the theory that charitable corpora-
tions hold their funds as trustees. In this case, decided in 1927,2 the court
was asked to authorize a mortgage on a school building in order to raise
funds for its proper maintenance. The donors, in unequivocal terms, had
forbidden such encumbrance. The court, in discussing the problem, ob-
viously considers that it is called upon to vary the terms of an express
trust. At no point in the discussion does it suggest the idea that the cor-
poration might hold its plant funds as absolute owner. It refuses permis-
sion to encumber the property on the grounds that, since the doctrine of
procedure. I have no opinion of counsel to offer in this connection but the
fact that all but seven of our two hundred and fifty funds are merged in
one investment pool places emphasis on our general administrative plan."
Correspondence of November 22, 1937.
Four other representative institutions show the following merged endow-
ment figures, according to latest available financial reports:
Merged Unmerged
Dartmouth College .......................................... $11,848,809.90 $5,579,247.81
Princeton University ...................................... 27,791,659.19 2,264,513.29
University of Pittsburgh .............................. 1,006,877.86 2,120,555.48
Washington University .................................. 18,456,181.89 3,235,085.06
Thus it would seem that a consistent policy of merging or "pooling" a
substantial proportion of endowment investments is indicated. Just what
influence a showing of facts of this character would have upon a court,
confronted with the problem of passing upon the legality of merged invest-
ments, is a question worthy of consideration.
1. Ala. Ann. Code (1928) sec. 14.
2. Lovelace v. Marion Institute (1926) 215 Ala. 271, 110 So. 381; Note
(1915) 1 Va. L. Reg. (N. S.) 161.
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judicial cy pres or approximation proceeds on the assumption that, were
the donors alive and cognizant of the changed conditions, they would con-
sent to the alteration, it can obviously have no application in this case, for,
said the court:
The donors knew that buildings fall into decay, but as clearly as
words could express the idea they state their will that the property
shall not be alienated or encumbered. Evidently the expectation was
the funds for repairs should be supplied from a different source.3
An earlier case' was concerned with the following bequest:
I give, devise and bequeath * * * to the trustees and their succes-
sors, of Milton College, in trust to be invested and held by said
trustees as an endowment for the benefit of the theological department
of said college.
The department of theology was discontinued and abandoned by the col-
lege. If this endowment had been held in trust, the court, through the
exercise of cy pres, could have appointed some other institution, with a
theological department, as trustee, or perhaps permitted Milton College to
utilize it for courses in ethics and philosophy. Instead the court chose to
regard the abandonment of the department as a breach of a condition, evi-
dently on the theory that the original donation had been an outright gift to
the corporation, on condition that it be used as directed. The property was
held to revert to the heirs of the testator. This, despite a provision of the
college charter giving the trustees specific authority to determine what ap-
plication should be made of endowments in the event of the discontinuance
of a department.
The conflict in viewpoint of the two cases is apparent, with the recent
trend toward the trust fund doctrine.
2. Arkansas
Arkansas adopted all English statutes passed prior to 1606, 5 including,
therefore, the Statute of Elizabeth.
A small college in that state accepted bonds from a donor and wife,
agreeing to pay them a life income. It sold the bonds, purchased a new
heating plant, and later became insolvent. The court held that the annui-
tants were entitled to a lien on all trust funds in the hands of the receiver.
If these were trust funds in the true sense of the word, dedicated to the
promotion of education, it seems rather anomalous that the liability of the
college to two individuals under an annuity contract should be permitted to
dissipate them.6
3. California
One brief quotation sheds some light on the attitude of the California
courts:
The bequest under consideration here does not by its terms create
any trust whatever. It reads as follows: "I give and bequeath unto the
3. 110 So. at 383.
4. Trustees of Cumberland University v. Caldwell (1919) 203 Ala. 590,
84 So. 846.
5., Ark. Kirby's Dig. Stats. (1904) sec. 623.
6. Word v. Spark (1935) 191 Ark. 893, 82 S.W. (2d) 5.
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French Hospital of the City of Los Angeles the sum of five thousand
dollars." The legal effect of the bequest is to make the money the abso-
lute property of the respondent, and the language does not impose
upon it any trust.7
An outright gift without restrictions as to use of either income or prin-
cipal is usually thus considered to become the absolute property of the cor-
poration. Apparently the California courts have not been called upon to
decide the character of a more restricted gift.
4. Colorado
In 1902 the Colorado courts, after deciding that the Statute of Elizabeth
was in force in the state, ruled that the municipal corporation of the City
of Denver held a bequest for the establishment of a school for orphan boys
as trustees of a charitable trust.8
5. Connecticut
The decisions of this state are of special interest. Early in its history
(1684) it adopted the substance of the Statute of Elizabeth, and it is still
in force.9 Yet its courts are in line10 with the decisions in Virginia, New
York, and other jurisdictions where the statute is not available to preserve
charitable gifts. One of the earliest cases to announce this doctrine with
clarity was that of Pierce v. Phelps."l The will of the testator was as fol-
lows:
* * * all the remainder of my estate to the Advent Christian Pub-
lishing Society * * * which society I charge with the duty of faith-
fully performing the legacy, according to their wisdom and judgment,
chiefly by publication, in counteracting, as far as may be, that great-
est of all pagan delusions, namely the unscriptural, unreasonable, and
pernicious doctrine of the immortality of the soul.
The court said:
We are of the opinion that it [the remainder] is given absolutely
and not in trust. * * * This amounts merely to a gift for corporate
use, coupled with a direction that it be applied principally to one of
those uses.12
An even stronger case, where the use of the words "in trust" was not
sufficient to sway the court, is that of Dwyer v. Leonard,13 involving the
following language:
I give, devise and bequeath to the New York Association for Im-
proving the Condition of the Poor, to hold the same in trust, and to
expend the income thereafter annually in sending poor children resid-
ing in any part of said city, into the county during the summer months.
The case of Pierce v. Phelps was cited as authority for the proposition
7. In re Dol's Estate (1920) 182 Cal. 159, 187 Pac. 428, 432.
8. Clayton v. Hallett (1902) 30 Col. 231, 70 Pac. 429, 59 L. R. A. 407.
9. Conn. Gen. Stats. (1930) sec. 5000.
10. Lockwood v. Weed (1817) 2 Conn. 287; Eccles v. Rhode Island Hos-
pital Trust Co. (1916) 90 Conn. 592, 98 Atl. 129; Lyme High School Ass'n
v. Alling (1931) 113 Conn. 200, 154 At]. 439.
11. (1902) 75 Conn. 83, 86, 52 Atl. 612.
12. 52 Atl. at 613.
13. (1924) 100 Conn. 513, 124 Atl. 28, 29, 30.
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that no technical trust was created and hence the New York Association
need not qualify with the Connecticut court as testamentary trustee.
The majority opinion of Loomis Institute v. Healy- is equally vigorous
in support of the general doctrine, but the dissent is of some significance:
My brethren hold the words of this clause are mere words of advice
and conmment and in consequence, the invested funds of this institu-
tion, of about a million and a half thus far set apart by the trustees
in their belief that the language of this clause was imperative and
must be carried out by them, may be expended by the trustees of this
institution at their discretion and without regard to these perpetuity
requirements. * * * It is my belief that the diversion of these chari-
table funds from the purposes designated by the testator will injure
not alone this institution but all institutions of learning which live in
greater part upon the bounty of the dead.15
6. Illinois
This state adopted the Statute of Elizabeth in 1845, and its courts have
uniformly declared that it forms a part of the common law of the state. 6
Two cases in 1911 seemed to indicate a distinct preference for the rule that
charitable corporations hold their funds, especially those received subject to
conditions or restrictions, as charitable trusts.17 By 1924 a trend in the
other direction was observable,S and a casei9 last year apparently carries
Illinois almost in line with the Virginia-New York group. To quote:
"It is my will that said property, when turned over to said Union
Academy, shall become part of its endowment funds." * * * The plain-
tiff contends that the direction in the will that the property when
turned over to the academy shall become a part of its endowment
fund is to be treated as creating a trust in the hands of the academy
for a particular purpose. * * * The academy, being a charitable cor-
poration, chartered for the purpose of furnishing higher education,
was dependent upon charity for funds to carry out its corporate pur-
poses. * * * It was a gift to a charitable institution to be used by it
for the charitable purpose for which the academy was organized,
higher education, and the direction to carry it in an endowment fund
did not limit the use or mark it for any particular purpose so as to
constitute it a trust fund.20
By implication at least, this court seems to hold that if the income from
this endowment had been restricted to a special department or course of
study, this would be sufficient to change the absolute title of the corpora-
tion to that of a trustee. It is to be doubted whether the court would so
hold, if confronted squarely with the issue, provided the department was
clearly one of the charter functions of the institution. It refuses to be
bound by the reasoning in Hobbs v. Board of Education:21
14. (1922) 98 Conn. 102, 119, Atl. 31.
15. 119 Atl. at 40.
16. See Skinner v. Northern Trust Co. (1919) 288 I1. 229, 123 N. E. 289;
Heuser v. Harris (1867) 42 Ill. 425.
17. French v. Calkins (1911) 252 11. 243, 96 N. E. 877; Monticello Semi-
nary v. Madison County Board of Review (1911) 249 Ill. 481, 94 N. E. 938.
18. Trustees of Rush Medical College v. University of Chicago (1924)
312 I1. 109, 143 N. E. 434.
19. Grear v. Sifford (1937) 289 Ill. App. 450, 7 N. E. (2d) 371.
20. 7 N. E. (2d) at 373, 375.
21. (1934) 126 Neb. 416, 253 N. W. 627.
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The plaintiff relies upon Hobbs v. Board of Education as support-
ing its theory that a gift to an endowment fund of a charitable insti-
tution is a gift in trust, but an examination of that case discloses that
the instrument under which the gift was made provided that the gift
was made "for the purpose of endowment for said institution, and to
be invested and preserved inviolable as such and upon condition that
a like amount should be raised from other sources and set apart in-
violably as endowment for said college."22
It is rather difficult to see to what extent the Illinois court has succeeded
in differentiating the terms of the gift before it and the one in the Hobbs
case. In both, the fund was to be preserved and held as a general endow-
ment.
7. Iowa
The Iowa courts, after some early hesitation,23 have accepted the Statute
of Elizabeth or at least the English doctrine of charities. In Starr v. Morn-
ingside College,24 however, the court unfortunately preferred to evade
the problem of the status of endowment funds. The pertinent provision
reads:
I do now hereby will and direct that said sum of $2,000 be added
to and made a part of the endowment fund of said Charles City Col-
lege, located at Charles City, Iowa, and that the same be in no manner
used or disposed of by them.
Merger was proposed with another college of the same denomination in an-
other city, and heirs of the donor demanded the fund. The college contended
that it was an absolute gift to the college corporation. The court replied:
It is, in a sense, a trust. * * * whether it is strictly and technically
a trust we shall not discuss, preferring to place our decision on an-
other ground,-that the gift was not a conditional one, because
Charles City College was located at Charles City, but rather the inten-
tion of the testator was to further the cause of education and religion.25
The case of Curtis and Barker v. Central University of Iowa2a contains
one significant comment to the effect that it is the rule in some cases, as
argued by the claimant, that where the trustee and cestui que trust are
the same, the title merges. But the court continued with the observation
that the trustees of the college hold the fund for the benefit of the college
and the donors, impliedly reasoning that the college could not be said to
hold absolute title. The other Iowa cases 27 also fail to come to grips with
the essential factors of the problem.
8. Kansas
The courts of Kansas have always accepted the English charity doctrine
whenever the issue has been before them.28 A case arising in 190720 was
22. 7 N. E. (2d) at 375.
23. Marshall v. Chittenden (Iowa 1852) 3 C. Greene 382; Mill v. Chit-
tenden (1856) 2 Iowa 315.
24. (1919) 186 Iowa 790, 173 N. W. 231.
25. 173 N. W. at 233.
26. (1920) 188 Iowa 300, 176 N. W. 330.
27. Lupton v. Leander Clark College (1922) 194 Iowa 1008, 187 N. W.
196; Schnell v. Leander Clark College (D. C. N. D. Iowa 1926) 10 F. (2d)
542.
28. Harrison v. Brophy (1898) 59 Kan. 1, 51 Pac. 883; Ingleside Ass'n v.
Nation (1910) 83 Kan. 172, 109 Pac. 984.
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decided on the theory that a scholarship fund bequeathed to an incorporated
educational institution was held as "an educational trust, which is a public
charity." By 1920 the court was ready to agree that a bequest of an endow-
ment fund to a municipal corporation, the income of which was to be used
"for the purpose of maintaining a public park, which shall bear my name,
* * * and for no other purpose" vests the city with absolute title, with merely
a limitation upon the use to which the property is to be devoted.30
9. Kentucky
By early decisions Kentucky was held to have adopted the Statute of
Elizabeth by implication in 1792.31 Three cases 32 gleaned from the digests
show a trend in favor of the trusteeship of charitable corporations. But
a federal court3 3 sitting in Kentucky, held that a share of national bank
stock, registered in the name of the Cumberland College, was not held in
trust so as to defeat an assessment on stockholders of bank stock.
10. Louisiana
The civil law precedents in this state import "a flavor which is exotic
to common law lawyers, '34 and its decisions are not of great weight in
other states for this reason. Two citations 35 should suffice.
11. Maine
In 1820 the northern portion of Massachusetts was admitted to the Union
as the sovereign State of Maine, and among the laws inherited from the
mother state was the Statute of Elizabeth. At a comparatively early date
(1888), it evidenced a preference for the Virginia-New York rule.36
12. Massachusetts
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts accepted the Statute of Elizabeth
29. 'irustees of W\ashburn College v. O'Hara (1907) 75 Kan. 700, 90
Pac. 234.
30. Schnack v. City of Larned (1920) 106 Kan. 177, 186 Pac. 1012.
31. Moore v. Moore (1836) 34 Ky. 354.
32, Carroll County Academy v. Trustees of Gallatin Academy (Ky. 1898)
47 S. W. 617; Central University of Kentucky v. Walter's Ex'rs (1906)
122 Ky. 65, 90 S. W. 1066; Baily v. Waddy (1922) 195 Ky. 415, 243 S. W. 21.
33. Gamble v. Cumberland College (D. C. E. D. Ky. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 767.
34. Zollman, American Law of Charities (1924) sec. 83.
35. Hutchinson v. Tulane University (1931) 171 La. 653, 131 So. 838;
Succession of Hutchinson (1904) 112 La. 656, 36 So. 639. In the latter case
the gift was made in the following language: "I give the balance of my
estate * * * to the Tulane University to create a fund for the sole and ex-
clusive benefit of its Medical Department." The court said: "Here is an
unconditional gift coupled only with an announcement of the object of the
gift. This certainly vests the title in the university. * * * The subsequent
paragraphs do not purport to withdraw the title thus vested * * * but
merely contain advisory directions regarding the use of the property." 36
So. at 654.
36. Whitmore v. Church of the Holy Cross (1922) 121 Me. 391, 117 AtI.
469; Snow v. President & Trustees of Bowdoin College (1934) 133 Me. 195,
175 Atl. 268; Dascomb v. Marston (1888) 80 Me. 223, 13 Atl. 888. Construing
a gift of "$50,000 to the Maine Insane Hospital, the income only to be ex-
pended annually," the court declared: "These donations are absolute, to
enable the donee to compass certain specific objects within the scope and
purpose of its charter and incident to the beneficial design of its founda-
tion." 13 Atl. at 889.
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along with other "statutes of the realm," at an early date.37 The decisions
on the issue under discussion are conflicting. Among those holding that the
corporation holds as owner and not as trustee is Brigham v. Peter Bent
Brigham Hospital.3 8 Two other cases show a similar trend,3 9 whereas four
earlier cases are emphatic in declaring that a charitable trust results from
such a gift or bequest.40
13. New Hampshire
In New Hampshire the courts have merely taken notice that the statute
has not been repealed and that the legislature has not spoken on the subject
of charities.41 They have, however, rejected the Virginia-New York doc-
trine, as indicated by the case of Trustees of Pembroke Academy v. Epsom
School District. 2 Other cases, although not directly in point, seem to sus-
tain the conclusion that the New Hampshire courts prefer to regard such
funds as trusts.
14. New Jersey
The courts in this state, although insisting that the Statute of Elizabeth
as such is not in force,4 - have agreed that the English common law of char-
ities was taken over as it existed in England, independent of the statute.45
They have also been fairly consistent in holding that gifts and bequests to
charitable corporations are trusts. A scholarship fund to be held by the
37. Going v. Emery (1834) 33 Pick. (Mass.) 107.
38. (C. C. A. 1, 1904) 134 Fed. 513, 517: "We should observe that the
corporation contemplated by the will was not to hold in trust, in the tech-
nical sense of the word, the property which it might receive. It was to hold
it for its own purposes, in the usual way in which charitable institutions
hold their assets. Such a holding is sometimes called a quasi-trust, and an
institution like the one in question is subject to visitation by the state; but
the holding does not constitute a true trust."
39. McNeilly v. First Presbyterian Church (1923) 243 Mass. 33, 137
N. E. 691; Greek Orthodox Community v. Malicourtis (1929) 267 Mass. 472,
166 N. E. 863.
40. Drury v. Inhabitants of Natick (1865) 92 Allen (Mass.) 169; Presi-
dents & Fellows of Harvard College v. Att'y Gen. (1917) 228 Mass. 396,
117 N. E. 903; Amory v. Trustees of Amherst College (Mass. 1918) 118
N. E. 933; Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Att'y Gen. (Mass.
1920) 126 N. E. 521.
41. Haynes v. Carr (1901) 70 N. H. 463, 49 At]. 638; Union Baptist
Society v. Candia (1819) 2 N. H. 20, 21.
42. (1910) 75 N. H. 408, 75 Atl. 100. The gift was **** to the trustees
of Pembroke Academy the sum of $1000 in money, the annual income of
which sum I wish to be expended in paying the tuition of such poor boys
in said town of Epsom, of good moral character * * *." To the plaintiff's
contention that the precatory words used created no enforceable obligation,
the court said: "The intent of the testator was to direct the disposition of
the income of the fund. It was a command 'clothed merely in the language
of civility.' Precatory words in a will, equally with direct fiduciary ex-
pressions, will constitute a trust." 75 Atl. at 101.
43. Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) 4 Wheat. 518; Glover v.
Baker (1912) 76 N. H. 393, 83 At]. 916.
44. Hesketh v. Murphy (1882) 8 Stew. (35 N. J. Eq.) 231, aff'd (1882)
9 Stew. (35 N. J. Eq.) 304.
45. MacKenzie v. Presbytery of Jersey City (1905) 67 N. J. Eq. 652,
61 At]. 1027, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227.
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Pennington Academy "for the education of all the poor children in the
district forever,""4 and an endowment fund of the Morristown School
Foundations "to increase the salaries of the teaching staff and for the
general purposes of the school" 41; were both referred to by the court as
"charitable trusts." However, a scholarship fund bequeathed to the Wo-
man's Medical College of Pennsylvania was said "to be held for the educa-
tional purposes for which the corporation was formed."4 This language is
more appropriate to absolute ownership than to trusteeship. A more recent
case 49 refuses to apply the doctrine of cy pres to a gift to a German school,
where there had been a change in name and curriculum.
15. North Carolina
Only one case50 in this state on this subject was found, and it is in sup-
port of the doctrine of absolute title. A deed "for the purpose of aiding
in the establishment of a Home for Indigent Widows and Orphans, or in
the promotion of any other charitable or religious objects to which the
property hereinafter conveyed may be appropriated * * *," did not create
a trust for the purposes mentioned in the deed.
16. Oregon
In Oregon the English doctrine of charities has been recognized by the
courts without direct legislative recognition.51 Three cases,52 all decided
during the past fifteen years, show a strong inclination to view all bequests
and gifts to charitable corporations as creating technical trusts.
17. Rhode Island
Although the English doctrine of charities in Rhode Island does not rest
upon any statutes now in effect, the spirit of earlier statutes incorporating
the substance of the Elizabeth Statute lives on in its decisions.5 3 In 1931
its courts were called upon to construe the following will:5 4
I give and devise my said Newport estate * ** -with the personal
property * * * to the said Art Association of Newport (a corporation)
46. Green v. Blackwell (N. J. 1896) 35 Atl. 375.
47. Crane v. Morristown School Foundation (N. J. 1936) 187 Atl. 632,
(1937) 85 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 431.
48. Cooke v. Woman's Medical College of Pa. (1913) 82 N. J. Eq. 179,
87 Atl. 131.
49. Raque v. City of Speyer, Germany, (N. J. 1925) 129 AtI. 207, 208:
"It was argued that, under the doctrine of cy pres, effect should be given
to the gift in the alternative. I do not think so. That doctrine is applicable
only to technical charitable trusts." Thus it would seem that a gift with-
out restrictions upon use of either income or principal is not a technical trust
in New Jersey.
50. St. James Parish v. Bagley (1905) 138 N. C. 384, 50 S. E. 841.
51. In re John's Will (1896) 30 Ore. 494, 47 Pac. 341, 50 Pac. 226, 36
L. R. A. 242.
52. In re Kulka's Estate (1933) 142 Ore. 104, 18 P. (2d) 1036; State
ex rel. Crutz v. Tony (1933) 141 Ore. 406, 17 P. (2d) 1105; Wemme v.
First Church (Ore. 1923) 219 Pac. 618. See Note (1924) 3 Ore. L. Rev. 241;
Comment (1924) 22 Mich. L. Rev. 499.
53. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Olney (1884) 14 R. I. 449.
54. McLyman ex rel. v. Art Ass'n of Newport (1931) 51 R. I. 273, 154
Atl. 117, 118, 119.
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without restrictions, except that I wish the rooms on the ground floor
kept * * * in the same condition as when * * * the Association shall
come into possession * * * and I wish an inscription placed over the
door of said house, as follows, "Sara Swan Whitney Memorial."
The testatrix also bequeathed a fund of $100,000
to be held by the said Association for the purposes for which it is in-
corporated; subject to the following provisions: The said principal
shall be invested by said * * * Association as a permanent fund and
the income derived therefrom shall be applied to the care, maintenance
and extension of my Newport estate.
The Association contended that the real estate and fund had been be-
queathed to it for the purpose of its charter, that the'will vested in it the
absolute and uncontrolled discretion in the management and control of the
property, and that no trust for public exhibit was created, but that the
provisions were advisory and not mandatory.
The court rejected this argument with the statement that there was no
doubt that the fund was given in trust for the specific purposes set forth.
On the other hand, the court has said:
An absolute gift to a charitable organization without reference to
the uses to which it may be put, and without the use of the words "in
trust" is, if such be the testator's intention, for the purposes of the
organization and this notwithstanding the possibility of its misuse."
Thus it is the imposition of conditions and limitations upon user that is
held to create the trustee relationship in Rhode Island.
18. South Dakota
South Dakota's Civil Code of 191056 adopted that portion of the common
law applicable to its conditions and not repugnant to its constitution. The
leading case57 on the question under discussion was concerned with the
following provisions of the will:
* * * in fee to the Norwegian Lutheran Church to be used in the
support and maintenance of foreign missions of said church.
The appellants contended that the remainder to the church was a per-
petual trust for the benefit of foreign missions of said church and hence
void under South Dakota law with reference to restraint of alienation of
real estate. The court, faced with the dilemma of either sacrificing the
charity or refusing to find words of trust intent, chose to follow the Vir-
ginia and New York courts.
19. Tennessee
Tennessee was originally part of North Carolina, and in 1778 the parent
state adopted all such English statutes as were consistent with its form of
government.58 No further action was taken by the Tennessee legislature
55. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Williams (1929) 50 R. I. 385,
148 Atl. 189, 191, 74 A. L. R. 664. See also South Kingstown v. Wakefield
Trust Co. (1926) 48 R. I. 27, 134 Atl. 815; Tillinghast v. Council (1926)
47 R. I. 406, 133 Atl. 662.
56. S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) c. 1, see. 3.
57. In re Havesgaard Estate (1931) 59 S. D. 26, 238 N. W. 130.
58. Green v. Allen (1844) 5 Humph. (24 Tenn.) 170.
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after separation. In 1931 Vanderbilt University was challenged in its use
of funds left under the following will:
I give and bequeath in trust in Vanderbilt University, in trust to
use the net income * * * to assist poor and deserving students * * *
It is further my desire that said University lend the income rather
than make absolute gifts.
Despite the use of the words "in trust," the court held that the trustees
have discretion not controllable by the court whether to lend or to give. The
expression of a desire that income be loaned, not given, was said to be
merely precatory.5 9
59. Vanderbilt University v. Mitchell (1931) 162 Tenn. 217, 36 S. W.
(2d) 83. Other cases showing a similar trend are Johnson v. Johnson
(1893) 8 Pickle (92 Tenn.) 559, 23 S. W. 114, 22 L. R. A. 179; Carson v.
Carson (1905) 115 Tenn. 37, 88 S. W. 175; Milligan v. Greenville College
(Tenn. 1928) 2 S. W. (2d) 90.
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